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1 Summary / Resumen  
  
Summary 
Avian Influenza (AI), a highly contagious disease affecting the respiratory, digestive 
and nervous systems of domestic and wild bird species, has become a major 
veterinary and public health concern (due to its potential to infect humans). AI 
occurs worldwide. There are numerous virus strains and aquatic birds are the 
natural virus reservoirs of all of them.  
AI can be transmitted from wild birds to poultry, but afterwards it is often 
perpetuated in poultry by transmission via human-driven factors, i.e. direct contact 
with infected poultry, or through fomites, i.e. people, vehicles, etc. Live bird 
markets and unregulated backyard bird populations with low biosecurity play 
critical roles in AI spread. 
In poultry, AI can lead to a variety of clinical presentations, depending mostly on the 
strain and species affected. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) mortalities can 
reach 100% in terrestrial poultry (e.g. chickens and turkeys), but often lead to no 
signs in domestic waterfowl. Instead, low pathogenic avian influenza viruses 
(LPAIVs) may result in inapparent infections or mild respiratory disease that often 
go unnoticed. HPAI have to be reported and controlled according to all national and 
international regulations, but the situation is not always so clear for LPAI. The 
current H5N1 HPAI panzootic has attracted great attention due to its historically 
unprecedented magnitude.  
Since there is no effective treatment for AI, preventing it the entry into poultry 
populations, and controlling it as soon as it is detected are the best ways to 
minimise the impact of the disease. Both prevention and control largely rely on and 
effective surveillance system to provide with early detection and to inform on the 
disease status and the effectiveness of measures in place. Awareness raising and 
training of all relevant stakeholders is a cross-cutting approach with direct impact in 
the implementation of all three components, i.e. prevention, control and 
surveillance activities.  
Surveillance strategies for AI vary from country to country and over time, 
depending on the infection and risk status of the country, and whether dealing with 
HPAI, reportable LPAI or LPAI. In any case, surveillance strategies should include 
activities to monitor wild bird populations and poultry using a combination of 
passive and active approaches.  
VI    |    Summary / Resumen 
Surveillance, particularly active approaches, can be very expensive. When dealing 
with limited, often insufficient budgets, cost-effectiveness becomes the top 
criterium in the design a surveillance program. The use of regular risk assessments 
will help to prioritize the sites, populations and species to target. Costs can also be 
reduced if surveillance tasks are combined with the implementation of other field 
activities, e.g. biosecurity assessments and improvement.  
Of all surveillance types, passive surveillance is the most cost-effective if 
implemented effectively. However, for LPAI, where clinical signs may be inapparent 
or very mild, conventional passive surveillance will not be efficient, and syndromic 
surveillance, a very novel approach of passive surveillance, presents a promising 
alternative. 
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Resumen 
La Influenza Aviar (IA) es una enfermedad altamente contagiosa que afecta a los 
sistemas respiratorio, digestivo y nervioso de aves domésticas y silvestres. La IA se 
ha convertido en un importante problema de salud veterinaria y pública (debido a 
su potencial zoonótico). La IA tiene una distribución mundial. Existen numerosas 
cepas de virus y las aves acuáticas son los reservorios naturales de todos ellos. 
La IA puede transmitirse de las aves silvestres a las aves de corral, pero después se 
perpetúa en las aves de corral debido a factores humanos, es decir, el contacto 
directo con aves de corral infectadas, o por medio de fomites (personas, vehículos, 
etc.). Los mercados de aves vivas y las poblaciones de aves de traspatio no 
reguladas juegan un papel crítico en la propagación de la IA. 
La presentación de la IA puede conducir a una variedad de presentaciones clínicas, 
dependiendo principalmente de la cepa y las especies afectadas. La influenza aviar 
de alta altamente patógena (IAAP) pueden alcanzar mortalidades de hasta el 100% 
en las aves domésticas terrestres (pollos y pavos), pero a menudo no producen 
ningún signo clínico en aves acuáticas domésticas. En cambio, la influenza aviar de 
baja patogenicidad (IABP) se presenta a menudo como infecciones inaparentes o 
enfermedad respiratoria leve, por lo que a menudo pasa desapercibida. La IAAP 
tiene que ser notificada y controlada de acuerdo con todas las normas nacionales e 
internacionales, pero la situación no siempre es tan clara para la IABP. La epidemia 
mundial de H5N1 IAAP ha atraído una gran atención por su magnitud sin 
precedentes históricos. 
Dado que no existe un tratamiento eficaz para la IA, impedir su entrada en las 
poblaciones de aves de corral, y controlarla tan pronto como se detecta son las 
mejores formas de minimizar el impacto de la enfermedad. Tanto la prevención 
como el control dependen en gran medida de que el sistema de vigilancia 
epidemiológica sea eficaz, lo que permite la detección temprana y proporciona 
información sobre el estado de la enfermedad y la eficacia de las medidas vigentes. 
La sensibilización y la formación de todos los involucrados es un enfoque 
transversal con impacto directo en la ejecución de los tres componentes, es decir, la 
prevención, el control y las actividades de vigilancia epidemiológica. 
Estrategias de vigilancia para la IA varían de país a país y con el tiempo, 
dependiendo del estado de la infección y el riesgo del país, y si se trata de la IAAP, 
IABP notificable o IABP. En cualquier caso, las estrategias de vigilancia deben incluir 
actividades para monitorear las poblaciones de aves silvestres y de corral utilizando 
una combinación de métodos pasivos y activos. 
La vigilancia epidemiológica, en particular los métodos activos, puede ser muy caro. 
Cuando se trabaja con presupuestos limitados, a menudo insuficientes, la 
rentabilidad se convierte en el criterio de mayor importancia en el diseño de un 
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programa de vigilancia. El uso de evaluaciones de riesgo regulares ayudará a 
identificar en qué localidades, poblaciones y especies enfocar la vigilancia 
epidemiológica. Los costos también pueden reducirse si las tareas de vigilancia se 
combinan con la aplicación de otras actividades sobre el terreno, como las 
evaluaciones y mejoras de bioseguridad. 
De todos los tipos de vigilancia epidemiológica, la pasiva es la más rentable si se 
aplica de manera efectiva. Sin embargo, para la IABP, donde los signos clínicos 
pueden ser inaparentes o muy leves, la vigilancia pasiva convencional no será 
eficiente. En estos casos, la vigilancia sindrómica, un enfoque muy novedoso de 
vigilancia pasiva, presenta una alternativa muy prometedora. 
 
Justificación    |   1 
2 Justificación  como compendio de publicaciones 
 
La presente Tesis Doctoral se presenta como un compendio de trabajos de 
investigación ya publicados, de los cuales cuatro son en revistas científicas 
indexadas en ISI-JCR, tal y como se establece en la normativa de la Universidad de 
Zaragoza. 
A continuación se presentan las referencias bibliográficas de los cinco trabajos 
publicados ordenadas cronológicamente, centrados todos ellos en el estudio de 
diferentes estrategias para la detección temprana de influenza aviar en poblaciones 
aviares domésticas: 
1) Daniel Beltran-Alcrudo, David A. Bunn, Christian E. Sandrock, Carol J. Cardona. 
Avian flu school: A training approach to prepare for H5N1 highly pathogenic 
avian influenza. Public Health Reports 2008; 123(3): 323-332 
2) Daniel Beltran-Alcrudo, Tim E. Carpenter, Carol Cardona. A flock-tailored early 
warning system for low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) in commercial egg 
laying flocks. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2009; 92: 324–332 
3) Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo, Sergei Khomenko, Sherrilyn Wainwright, Jan 
Slingenbergh. Main animal disease threats in 2010: pathogen types, drivers 
and challenges. EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin 2011; 37: 2-13 
4) David Bunn, Daniel Beltran-Alcrudo, Carol Cardona. Integrating surveillance 
and biosecurity activities to achieve efficiencies in national avian influenza 
programs. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2011; 98: 292–294 
5) Anke K. Wiethoelter, Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo, Richard Kock, Siobhan M. Mora. 
Global trends in infectious diseases at the wildlife-livestock interface. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America (PNAS) 2015; 112(31): 9662-9667 
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3 General introduction 
  
Avian influenza (AI) spread is one the biggest threats to animal health, not just 
because of the important damages to poultry production, local livelihoods and 
trade, but also because of the public health implications due to its zoonotic 
potential. Conventional veterinary approaches have failed to stop its spread and 
bring it under control. Beltran-Alcrudo et al. (2011) lists the major threats to animal 
health by geographical region, AI being one of the most critical. The paper also 
stresses the importance to use a one health multidisciplinary approach that 
confronts the root causes of disease emergence at the animal-human-environment 
interface, as opposed to the traditional veterinary approach, which has been so far 
unsuccessful in preventing avian influenza spread around the world.  
Avian influenza viruses (AIV) originate in wild bird species. Wild birds have shown to 
be able to spread the virus over large distances along migratory routes, which has 
translated into wild bird outbreaks and poultry outbreaks in some instances, when 
there are low biosecurity measures. Wiethoelter et al. (2015) proved that the wild 
bird-poultry interface is quite well researched, in fact the most researched of all 
wildlife-livestock interfaces. However, although the link between wild birds and 
poultry cannot be denied, the role of wild birds in AI outbreaks in poultry is largely 
outweighted by human driven factors, i.e. movements of poultry, poultry products 
and fomites. 
For the early detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), an effective 
surveillance system is crucial to minimize the costs of control before the disease has 
spread any further. For surveillance to be cost-effective and sustainable, it needs to 
be mostly based on passive surveillance, which relies on reporting, and some limited 
targeted active surveillance. Multidisciplinary training programs such as Avian Flu 
School (Beltran-Alcrudo et al., 2008) are critical to increase awareness and reporting 
from all stakeholders in the field, which is indispensable for passive surveillance, as 
well as to ensure that veterinary services are knowledgeable on how to design and 
implement targeted surveillance. 
Implementing HPAI prevention, surveillance and response national programs is a 
very expensive endeavour, which is often not affordable by the developing 
countries mostly affected by AI. As shown by Bunn et al. (2011), costs can be 
significantly reduced if some of the tasks are combined, particularly the 
implementation of field activities like surveillance and biosecurity improvement.  
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Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) infections often go undetected by traditional 
passive surveillance due to the very mild clinical signs. However the early detection 
of LPAIV infections is still very important because it may cause significant losses for 
commercial poultry producers if allowed to persist. In addition, LAIVs may become 
zoonotic and contribute genetic material to HPAIVs. Moreover, H5 and H7 LPAIV 
strains can mutate to HPAIVs. Since active surveillance for LPAI would be 
economically unsustainable, it is necessary to develop cost-effective approaches like 
syndromic surveillance based on monitoring production parameters (e.g. mortality 
or egg production) like the one proposed by Beltran-Alcrudo et al. (2009). This can 
be particularly powerful for the commercial poultry production, where these 
parameters are recorded on a daily basis. 
Background   |    5 
4 Background 
 
4.1. World avian production 
Poultry farming is the raising of domesticated birds for the purpose of producing meat or 
eggs for food, but also for their feathers, hunting or restocking purposes. This includes 
chickens, ducks, turkeys and geese, but also some game birds (e.g. quails, pheasants, etc.) 
and other minor species (e.g. ostriches, guinea fowls, pigeons, etc.). Poultry are farmed in 
great numbers (almost 24 billion in 2013). In terms of species, production is widely 
dominated by chickens (91%), followed by ducks (6%) (Table 1). Birds can also be farmed for 
ornamental purposes. 
Table 1. Poultry stocks at year 2013 (Source: FAOSTAT, 2015) 
Type of bird x 1,000 head % 
Chickens 21,744,361 90,7% 
Ducks 1,335,312 5,6% 
Geese and guinea fowls 389,457 1,6% 
Pigeons, other birds 32,355 0,1% 
Turkeys 459,419 1,9% 
TOTAL 23,962,917 100% 
Poultry meat represents over 30% of the meat produced and consumed worldwide, i.e. 88 
million tons, with chickens and turkeys representing 87% and 7% of poultry production, 
respectively. Similarly, hen eggs represent 92% of the egg production worldwide (FAO/EBRD 
2010). Despite these impressive figures, the sector continues growing (Figure 1), getting 
more and more industrialized in many parts of the world.  
 
Figure 1. Worldwide evolution of poultry heads in thousands of heads (1960-2013) 
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This has been largely driven by an increasing human population, greater purchasing power 
and urbanization. Poultry production is characterized by a large reproductive ratio, 
turnover rate and excellent feed conversion. In addition, poultry meat presents some 
advantages when compared to other meats, namely value/price, good nutritional 
profile/low in fat, convenience/ease of preparation, and versatility (FAO/EBRD, 2010). This 
explains why the average per capita consumption of poultry meat has almost quadrupled 
since the 1960s (FAO/EBRD, 2010). 
The poultry sector is widely distributed worldwide, concentrating primarily in Asia (mostly 
South, Southeast and East Asia) and the Americas (mainly North America, Mexico and 
Brazil), as depicted in Figure 2. The top four producing countries are China (with almost 
6 billion heads), the USA, Indonesia and Brazil (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2. Poultry heads by region (%) (Average 2010-13) (Source: FAOSTAT, 2015) 
 
Figure 3. Number of poultry heads by country (Average 2010-2013) (Source: FAOSTAT, 2015) 
There is a clear division between large-size, industrialized production systems, and 
extensive, usually small-scale, production systems. Industrialized production systems are 
largely organized and integrated into value chains (i.e. about 74% of the world's poultry 
meat and 68% of eggs) and use highly selected poultry breeds specialized for meat or egg 
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production. The continuous advances in feed, slaughter, processing technologies and 
health management have led to increased productivity, vertical integration and large-scale 
units associated to the feed industry, which concentrate themselves around input sources 
and final markets. On the other hand, extensive systems are traditional small-scale, rural, 
family-based poultry systems that use indigenous breeds and mostly support rural and 
periurban livelihoods and supply local markets in developing countries. This small-scale 
poultry, although progressively reducing its relative market share, still help generating 
(often secondary) income (particularly to women) and providing a high quality cheap 
source of protein (FAO, 2014). 
Diseases such as avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease (ND), etc. depress production and 
cause economic losses, particularly in developing countries. Many of these diseases also 
affect wild birds, thus complicating the epidemiology, prevention and control. The fact that 
some can also jump the species barrier into humans (i.e. zoonoses), raises public health 
concerns.  
Avian pathogens have often a transboundary nature. The capacity to rapidly detect, 
diagnose and control diseases is crucial to minimize losses and spread. While commercial 
poultry sites can exclude pathogens through biosecurity programmes, in developing 
countries, the often weak or absent biosecurity at farm level, predisposes for emerging 
pathogens to become endemic, as recently illustrated by the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) H5N1 pandemic.  
4.2. Avian influenza 
Avian influenza (AI) is a highly contagious disease affecting the respiratory, digestive and 
nervous systems of a variety of both domestic and wild bird species (Alexander, 2000). AI 
occurs worldwide. There are a large number of virus strains and aquatic birds are the 
natural virus reservoirs, representing a continuous source of infection. In poultry, AI can 
lead to a variety of clinical presentations, which often cannot be differentiated from 
endemic poultry diseases (Swayne and Suarez, 2000). The disease can spread to new 
geographic regions both through the trade (legal and illegal) of poultry, poultry products, 
and wild birds, and the movements of migratory wild birds.  
AI has become a major concern for veterinary and public health due to its ability to infect 
humans, amongst a variety of mammals. The H5N1 HPAI panzootic since 2003 has attracted 
much attention over the past two decades, due to its historically unprecedented magnitude 
in terms of the number of infected flocks, geographic spread, and economic consequences 
for agriculture, trade and livelihoods, together with its human health implications (Sims et 
al., 2005). 
Disease emergence in general is triggered by multiple, interrelated factors: human and 
animal demographics, climate change, increased mobility and globalization, urbanization, 
land degradation, and mass animal rearing. The resulting changes to host environments, 
and therefore to pathogen dynamics, can lead to adjustments such as expanding 
geographic range, jumping host species and/or shifts in virulence (Beltrán-Alcrudo et 
al., 2011).  
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From all major animal threats in recent years, H5N1 HPAI perhaps best illustrates the 
complexity of the factors involved in the local, national, regional and even global spread of 
a newly emerged animal pathogen. H5N1 HPAI has demonstrated what happens when a 
new virus enters a new host population (chickens) from where it can jump to further 
species (human infections, illustrating how the virulence of an agent can vary), and what 
happens when a new virus can spread across very large distances to new susceptible 
populations (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al., 2011). 
During the current fight against HPAI, it became clear that animal disease management has 
to be viewed in the broader context of sustainable agriculture and rural development, 
natural resource management and socio-economic development. Eastern Asia provides the 
setting for the mixing of poultry, pig and human influenza A viruses, which together 
constitute an expanding gene pool of diverse virus subtypes, clades and lineages circulating 
in the avian, swine and human host reservoirs, and thus representing a serious risk of 
emergence of new highly pathogenic transmissible viruses through recombination (Beltrán-
Alcrudo et al., 2011).  
This rapidly evolving situation highlights the urgent need for a new approach for disease 
prevention and control. Current approaches to animal disease prevention and control are 
based on the disruption of disease transmission (through stamping out, vaccination, 
quarantine and other veterinary sanitary measures). While these have proved effective in 
both short- and long-term disease control programmes, such as national responses to foot-
and-mouth disease outbreaks and global rinderpest eradication, they have been less 
successful in some instances, as shown by the current persistence of H5N1 HPAI, despite 
significant national and international efforts. This is because most current approaches apply 
strong veterinary science and medicine disciplines in isolation from other relevant 
disciplines, such as economics, sociology, anthropology, communication, and ecology and 
land management. Such straightforward veterinary approaches do not confront the root 
causes of disease emergence at the animal-human-environment interface. Beyond core 
laboratory and epidemiological surveillance functions, veterinary services now need to 
expand into an agro-ecological approach to control diseases better. This means focusing on 
identification of the drivers of disease flare-ups, depicting disease behaviour in the context 
of host availability and farming landscape dynamics, and investigating the role of 
ecosystem dynamics and wildlife as the source of pathogens infecting domestic animals 
and humans. The international community is increasingly converging on such a multi-
sectorial, multidisciplinary approach to addressing the increasing disease threats. This 
approach, termed “One Health”, outlines a collaborative, international, cross-sectorial, 
multidisciplinary mode of addressing threats and reducing risks of infectious diseases at the 
animal-human-ecosystem interface, including the wildlife component. Again, H5N1 HPAI has 
been perhaps the first time that the One Health concept has been applied for an 
international threat (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al., 2011). 
4.2.1. Aetiology and strain classification  
Avian influenza is caused by viruses belonging to the Orthomyxoviridae family, genus 
Influenzavirus A. Of the three influenza genera (A, B and C), only influenza A viruses infect 
birds. Influenza A is an enveloped virus containing eight segments of single stranded RNA, 
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which encode ten structural viral proteins. Among these, haemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA) are used to classify the different AIV into subtypes. To date, 16 HA 
subtypes (H1-H16) and 9 NA subtypes (N1-N9) are currently recognised in birds, which can 
occur in any combination, plus two additional HA and NA types been identified, to date, just 
in bats (Tong et al., 2013). There is usually little or no cross-protection between different HA 
or NA types. 
4.2.2. Official classification, i.e. notifiable AI; HPAI vs. LPAI 
Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) can be pathotyped into two groups depending on the 
severity of the disease they cause in naıve chickens. The HA is considered to be the major 
determinant of virulence (Senne et al., 1996). The virulent types, termed highly pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) are associated with mortality approaching 100% and severe 
decreases in egg production. To date, HPAI have been associated only with H5 and H7 
subtypes. However, the majority of AIV isolates, including H5 and H7, are of low virulence, 
i.e. low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. 
There is the risk of a H5 or H7 LPAI becoming virulent by mutation. Although it does not 
always occur, the transmission of AIVs from their natural reservoir to other species is 
related to the acquisition of virulence, i.e. HPAIVs arise after a mutation of H5 or H7 LPAIVs 
that have been introduced to poultry from wild birds (Capua and Marangon, 2006). The HA 
of LPAIV is cleaved by enzymes present in epithelial cells and respiratory secretions 
(Swayne, 2007). This explains why LPAI viruses, when entering the host by inhalation or 
ingestion, remain in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts. Instead, the HA of HPAIV is 
cleaved by enzymes found throughout the body, which translates in HPAI infections being 
systemic and more severe (Swayne, 2007). 
Although, the timing of a mutation is unpredictable, it can be assumed that the wider and 
longer the circulation of LPAIVs in poultry, the more opportunities for the virus to mutate 
into an HPAIV (Alexander, 2007). Examples of changes in virulence include the outbreaks 
due to H7N3 in Canada (Bowes et al., 2004), H7N3 in Chile (Bean et al., 1985; Rojas et al., 
2002), H5N2 in USA (Bean et al., 1985), H5N2 in Mexico (Swayne et al., 1997), H5N2 in Italy 
(Capua and Marangon, 2000) and H7N7 in the Netherlands (Elbers et al., 2004). Because of 
the risk of a H5 or H7 LPAI becoming virulent by mutation, all H5 and H7 viruses have to be 
reported to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (OIE, 2015a).  
According to the OIE definition, all infections of poultry caused by HPAIV or H5 or H7 
viruses, regardless of their pathogenicity for chickens, have to be reported to the OIE (OIE, 
2015a). These reportable avian influenzas can be HPAI and LPAI. HPAI include all HPAIV plus 
those H5 or H7 isolates with a HA0 cleavage site amino acid sequence similar to those of 
HPAI viruses. Reportable LPAIVs are all H5 and H7 viruses that are not HPAIVs, i.e. H5 and 
H7 isolates that are not pathogenic for chickens and do not have an HA0 cleavage site 
amino acid sequence similar to any of those observed in HPAIVs (OIE, 2015b). 
4.2.3. Host range  
All AIV subtypes and most HA/NA combinations have been found in birds (Olsen et al., 
2006). Although many wild bird species may harbour influenza viruses, aquatic birds are 
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believed to be the source of most influenza A viruses (Webster et al., 1992). Anseriformes 
(especially ducks, geese, and swans) and two families within the Charadriiformes (the 
Laridae, i.e, gulls and terns, and Scolopacidae, i.e. shorebirds) harbour the widest variety of 
antigenic subtypes, constituting the major natural LPAIV reservoir (Webster et al., 1992; 
Olsen et al., 2006). Before the spread of Asian H5N1 HPAI, very few HPAI outbreaks had 
been described in wild birds. Ever since, Asian H5N1 HPAIV has been isolated in over 
150 different species of from 15 orders have been reported and are compiled by the US 
Geological Survey (USGS) National Wildlife Health Centre at http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/ 
disease_information/avian_influenza/affected_species_chart.jsp. 
A wide array of domestic birds may also be affected by avian influenza viruses, including 
domestic poultry (commercial Muscovy and mallard ducks, geese, quails, turkeys, guinea 
fowl, ostriches, pheasants, chukars, partridges and psittacines) and caged pet birds 
(Alexander, 2000). 
Although mammals are considered atypical hosts for AI, respiratory infections have been 
sporadically reported in minks, seals and whales, as well as some self-limiting sporadic 
infections in swine and humans (Swayne and Swayne, 2008). The host range is continuously 
expanding, and only the Asian H5N1 HPAI has been reported in 16 mammal species already, 
as reported by the USGS, including humans. At the time of writing (4 September 2015), the 
WHO reports 844 cases of H5N1 HPAI infection, including 449 fatalities (53% case fatality 
rate) in 16 countries (WHO, 2015a). Also H7N9 has recently caused 662 human infections in 
humans in China with a 40% case fatality rate (WHO, 2015b). In contrast with the severity of 
H5N1 HPAI, other avian influenza A viruses - LPAI (H7N2, H7N3, H9N2, or H10N7) and HPAI 
(H7N3 or H7N7 HPAI) - have caused sporadic human infections, usually after exposure to 
poultry, causing a wide spectrum of clinical presentations, from conjunctivitis and upper 
respiratory tract disease to pneumonia and multiorgan failure (Fouchier et al., 2004; Hirst et 
al., 2004; Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2006; Arzey et al., 2012; WHO, 2015b). Fortunately, 
persistent human-to-human transmission of these AIVs has not occurred. The most notable 
examples of the zoonotic potential of AI are the human influenza pandemics of 1957 (H2N2) 
and 1968 (H3N2), in which the HA genes probably originated from a reassortment of avian 
and human viruses (Scholtissek et al., 1978; Kawaoka and Webster, 1985; Kawaoka et al., 
1989). A zoonotic virus can also be generated by mutation of an AIV. 
4.2.4. Clinical presentation 
Avian influenza viruses circulate naturally in wild bird populations, the natural reservoir, 
where virus and host have reached an evolutionary equilibrium over time without usually 
causing any clinical disease. However, infection may be followed by a deteriorated body 
mass (Latorre-Margalef et al., 2009), and foraging and migratory performance can be 
hampered due to LPAI (van Gils et al., 2007). In addition, HPAIVs such as the H5N1 can cause 
massive mortalities.  
Low pathogenic avian influenza viruses may result in inapparent infections, particularly 
when the virus has recently been introduced from the wild to the domestic host (Swayne 
and Suarez, 2000) or in some poultry species, e.g. domestic waterfowl (Shortridge, 1982; 
Alexander, 2003). Other LPAIV infections may result in mild respiratory disease, depression, 
moderate egg production decline in laying birds, and low mortality (Capua and Alexander, 
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2004), which are easily mistaken for other disease syndromes and can cause substantial 
losses if allowed to persist in poultry populations. Some LPAI outbreaks may under certain 
circumstances lead to more severe symptoms similar to that of HPAI, especially in the 
presence of secondary infections, stressors or environmental conditions (Capua et al., 2003; 
OIE, 2015b). 
HPAI clinical presentation in fully susceptible birds (i.e. non-immunized) can vary depending 
on the species, age and type of bird, the AIV strain involved, and environmental factor (OIE, 
2015a). According to the OIE Terrestrial Manual (2012), clinical signs “may vary from one of 
sudden death with no overt clinical signs, to a more characteristic disease with variable clinical 
presentations including respiratory signs, such as ocular and nasal discharges, coughing, 
snicking and dyspnoea, swelling of the sinuses and/or head, apathy, reduced vocalisation, 
marked reduction in feed and water intake, cyanosis of the unfeathered skin, wattles and 
comb, incoordination and nervous signs and diarrhoea. In laying birds, additional clinical 
features include a marked drop in egg production, usually accompanied by an increase in 
numbers of poor quality eggs. Typically, high morbidity is accompanied by high and rapidly 
escalating unexplained mortality. However, none of these signs can be considered 
pathognomonic”. The clinical signs are usually more pronounced in chickens and turkeys, 
while in waterfowl (both domestic and wild), birds usually do not show severe disease or 
may no show disease at all (Koch and Elbers, 2006). 
The incubation period in poultry can range from a few hours to a few days. Also in 
mammals is short, e.g. as little as 1-2 days. 
4.2.5. AIV geographic distribution 
Avian influenza’s natural reservoirs, mostly Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, have a 
global distribution, except for the most arid regions, thus translating to an almost global 
coverage of AIV (Webster et al., 1992; Olsen et al., 2006).  
In terms of the distribution of AI in poultry (Figure 4), much more information is available 
on reportable outbreaks (particularly HPAI) than on LPAI outbreaks. The first reliable 
scientific report on HPAI outbreak in poultry took place around Torino, Italy, in 1877-1878 
(Perroncito, 1878), but the first outbreak caused for sure by a HPAIV was reported in 
Scotland, UK, in 1959. Since then, detailed compilations of HPAI outbreaks show their 
presence in most of the world, but mostly in North America, Europe and, more recently, 
Asia (Capua and Alexander, 2004; Alexander, 2007; OIE, 2015b). The most severe AI 
outbreak ever is the ongoing Asian H5N1 HPAIV.  
On the other hand, there is not such a wealth of information regarding LPAI outbreaks; 
despite they occur rather frequently in poultry, particularly in some regions such as North 
America. In fact, only between 2002 and 2006, Alexander (2007) lists sixty LPAIV strains 
isolated from poultry and other captive birds. The real number will likely be higher, since 
many outbreaks remain undetected or unreported (Alexander, 2007). Sometimes, when 
LPAIVs circulate in poultry populations for long periods, this may lead to the formation of 
stable virus lineages in poultry that can then spread considerably. Notorious examples 
include the H7N1 LPAIV in Italy (1999), which is still regularly reported in Italy and other 
European countries, H5N2 in Mexico (1993-present), which is circulating in Central America, 
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or H7N3 in Pakistan (1995) and H9N2 (1998) (Marangon et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Naeem 
and Siddique, 2006; Cecchinato et al., 2010). The US has experienced multiple LPAI 
outbreaks, e.g. Pennsylvania (H5N2 1985-1986; H7N2 1996-1998 and H7N2 2001-2002) and 
California, US (H6N2 2000-2004) (Dunn et al., 2003; Henzler et al., 2003; Kinde et al., 2003). 
 
Figure 4. Avian influenza outbreaks in domestic poultry in 2005-October 2015 (Source: EMPRES-i) 
4.2.6. The impact of AI 
Avian influenza outbreaks, like most other transboundary animal diseases, pose a serious 
threat not only to the poultry industry, but also to food security and livelihoods. In addition, 
with AI there is a public health component not to be forgotten. This section applies mostly 
to HPAI, since the losses caused by non-reportable AI are not usually calculated. 
The effects of HPAI on animal production can be divided into three main types: 1) direct 
losses to producers and other actors of the poultry market chain due to morbidity and 
mortality, risk mitigation (e.g. investment in animal housing), replacement birds, etc.; 
2) cost of government intervention, e.g. public investment in animal health infrastructure 
and epidemic preparedness; and 3) market reactions, which can be particularly severe when 
there are public health implications (Otte et al., 2008). 
The quantification of the above costs is complicated by numerous factors, e.g. control 
measures affect even producers not infected by HPAI, and similarly, market reactions can 
affect HPAI-free countries. Also, the direct impacts on farmers will spread through the 
supply and distribution networks. However, losses to the poultry sector will be to some 
extent compensated by gains in other livestock subsectors. Because of these ‘systemic’ 
reactions, the structure and flexibility of the poultry industry, its links with other sectors 
and its integration with global markets have to be taken into account (Otte et al., 2008). 
In terms of the costs related to the death and destruction of birds, the outbreaks of 2003 
and 2004 in Asian countries are good examples of the magnitude of H5N1 HPAI. Direct 
losses were highest in Vietnam (44 million birds, i.e. 17.5% of the poultry population, and a 
cost estimated at 0.3%-1.8% of GDP), Thailand (29 million; 14.5%; 1.5% of GDP) and Indonesia 
(16.2million) (McLeod et al., 2005). Thailand, at the time the world’s 5th exporter of poultry 
meat, loss big part of the market for fresh poultry meat, also because of the international 
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competition and high dynamism of the global poultry market allowed for other countries 
(mostly Latin America) to quickly fill in the market lost by Thailand (McLeod et al., 2005). 
Overall, export shortages due to HPAI and higher prices led to an unprecedented 8% drop in 
global poultry trade, with Asian exports (particularly Thailand and China) declining from 
1.8 million to less than 1 million tonnes. Based on some of these figures, it was estimated 
that a single large outbreak could lead to a reduction of up to 1.5% of GDP growth 
considering the effects on the poultry sector alone. The reality is that other associated 
losses would arise, e.g. to tourism, as actually reported by both Thailand and Malaysia 
(McLeod et al., 2005). 
The impact of HPAI vary by the type of production system: industrial chains suffer mostly 
from export loss, while large commercial producers serving domestic markets will be 
penalized by the loss of consumer confidence. Small producers will lose most relative to 
their assets and income, particularly backyard poultry farmers with no alternative livestock 
production to which to switch to (McLeod et al., 2005). 
Obayelu (2007) pointed out a number of socio-economic impacts in his analysis of the H5N1 
HPAI impact in Nigeria, such as job losses, or the temporary loss of consumer confidence, 
i.e. about 80% of regular poultry consumers shifted to other protein types, which lead to a 
drop in prices of poultry products (and an increase in other livestock products). About 75% 
of the poultry suppliers contemplated to change business. The cost of prevention and 
control was estimated at 0.1-0.2% reduction in the GDP (Obayelu, 2007). 
Moreover, avian influenza viruses pose a real zoonotic threat, which adds a whole public 
health dimension to be considered. The H5N1 HPAI strain, despite its high case fatality rates, 
has not fully adapted to humans, and human-to-human transmission is still anecdotal. 
However, the risk that an AIV will adapt and cause a pandemic is a continuous threat, as 
shown in previous human influenza pandemics of 1957 (H2N2) and 1968 (H3N2), probably 
the result of reassortments of avian and human viruses. 
4.2.7. Persistence of AIV in the environment 
The successful transmission of AIVs to susceptible hosts is largely determined by the 
persistence of the virus in the environment. This knowledge will allow the development of 
prevention (e.g. effective biosecurity measures and cleaning and disinfection protocols), 
surveillance and other interventions against AI. 
Avian influenza viruses do not replicate outside the body of susceptible animals, but can 
persist in the environment for substantial periods of time (i.e. up to several weeks under 
the right conditions). Persistence is strongly influenced by the pH, temperature, and 
salinity, with most stability observed at a mildly basic pH (7.4-8.2), low temperatures 
(<17ºC), and fresh to brackish salinities (0-20,000 parts per million (ppm)). On the other 
hand, the viruses’ persistence was lower in acidic conditions (pH<6.6), warmer 
temperatures (>32ºC), and high salinity (>25,000 ppm) (Brown et al., 2007; Brown et 
al., 2009). As a result, AIV may persist in freshwater bodies for 2-3 months at 10°C and for over 
6 months at a 0°C (Nazir et al., 2011) and will also survive well in faeces and lake sediments 
(Chumpolbanchorn et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2008; Nazir et al., 2011). This ability of AIVs to 
remain infective in water bodies is key for the disease transmission within aquatic birds. 
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The transmission of AIVs may also occur through contaminated fomites. A study on twelve 
different porous and non-porous materials and objects routinely found on poultry farms 
showed that AIV survived on some of the surfaces for up to 6 days (e.g. in latex and 
feathers) (Tiwarï et al., 2006). Nasal secretions and faecal material protect AIVs, increasing 
their resistance to chemical and physical deactivation, which is critical in farm conditions. 
Survival of AIV in faeces is influenced by many variables, e.g. the viral strain, the host or the 
temperature (De Benedictis et al., 2007). For example, the H5N2 HPAIV from the 1983-1985 
Pennsylvania outbreak was shown experimentally to survive in wet faeces at 4°C for 
35 days, but only 2 days at 25°C (Beard et al., 1984). The same virus under natural field 
conditions was still detectable in wet manure after 44 and 105 days, as reported by 
Utterback (1984) and Fichtner (2003), respectively, although the range of temperature was 
not reported. On the other hand, H5N1 HPAIV was completely inactivated within just 30 min 
of direct sunlight at 32-35°C, although the virus was still infective after 4 days in the shade at 
25-32°C (Songserm et al., 2006). This information will be critical to determine how long to 
keep premises vacant after an outbreak.  
When looking at cleaning and disinfection protocols, it can be concluded that AIVs are 
readily deactivated at temperatures of 56°C at 60 min (Muhammad et al., 2001; Lu et al., 
2003), ionizing radiation, extreme pH (pH 1-3 or pH 10-14), and by a wide range of 
disinfectants, particularly in the absence of organic matter. The sensitivity of AIVs to 
chemicals is explained by the lipid viral envelope, which makes the virus highly susceptible 
to disinfectants (Benedictis et al., 2007). A comprehensive list of chemical product available 
for disinfecting procedures and their main recommendations and limitations of use can be 
found at De Benedictis et al. (2007). 
4.2.8. Between-host transmission 
The AIV strain, replication site and species involved will determine the presence, 
concentration and duration of viral particles in each secretion and tissue, and thus the role 
of each in disease transmission. In poultry, LPAI viruses replicate primarily in the epithelial 
tissue of the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts, with some viruses preferring one versus 
the other (Perkins and Swayne, 2001; Swayne and Beck, 2005), which explains why LPAIV 
mostly concentrate in faeces and/or secretions from the respiratory tract (Spickler et al., 
2008). Shedding can start as early as day 1 in respiratory secretions and day 2 in faeces 
(Spickler et al., 2008). In its natural reservoir, i.e. waterfowl, LPAI results in large amounts 
of virus excreted in faeces for 3 to 4 weeks, often without clinical signs.  
Instead, HPAIVs, after initial replication in the same organs, follow a systemic spread, 
meaning that the virus can be detected in numerous tissues including the muscle (meat), 
blood, bone marrow, upper and lower respiratory tract, kidney, spleen, liver, thymus, 
pancreas, bursa, adrenal gland, gastrointestinal tract, ovary, testis, comb, wattles, feather 
follicles and brain (Spickler et al., 2008). Shedding typically occurs within a day or two, both 
in faeces and respiratory secretions of chickens, but sometimes in just a few hours (Spickler 
et al., 2008). 
Transmission of LPAIVs occurs primarily via the faecal-oral route, as a result of waterfowl 
suffering from asymptomatic enteric infections shedding the virus via faeces into the water 
(Webster et al., 1992; Fouchier and Munster, 2009). Respiratory secretions and the faecal-
Background   |    15 
cloacal transmission are also potential routes (Ellström et al., 2008). Since LPAIVs can 
remain infectious in water for a long time (Brown et al., 2007), the virus can be transmitted 
to other aquatic birds, including domestic waterfowl.  
There is a seasonality attached to AIV transmission in their wild reservoirs, which depends 
on the geographical location and species involved. Prevalence rates and shedding patterns 
vary throughout the year. Aquatic birds tend to shed large amounts of virus when they are 
immunologically naïve juveniles (Webster et al., 1992). For example, AIV prevalence in North 
American waterfowl ranges from <1% (during spring migration) to 30% and even 60% just 
before and during fall migration, due to the large number juvenile birds (Hinshaw et al., 
1980; Krauss et al., 2004). In terms of the species, although geese and swans are less 
frequently infected than ducks (Olsen et al., 2006), their tendency to congregate in large 
groups on agricultural fields makes it more likely for them to infect domestic waterfowl. 
The wild bird-poultry interface is quite well researched, in fact the most researched of all 
wildlife-livestock interfaces ranking first in Asia, Europe, and North America and second in 
Oceania, Africa, and South America. Of all publications citing a bird-poultry interface, 22% 
were associated with avian influenza (Wiethoelter et al., 2015). Eventually, all AIVs 
circulating in poultry were initially introduced from the wild reservoir. In areas where AIVs 
are frequently isolated in chickens or turkeys, e.g. Missessotta, USA, the variation in virus 
subtype and the seasonality observed suggest multiple primary introductions rather than 
an endemic situation in poultry (Alexander, 2000). Between 1978 and 2000, Minnesota 
turkey farms experienced 108 LPAIV introductions from migratory ducks (Halvorson, 2002). 
However, although the link between wild birds and poultry cannot be denied, the role of 
wild birds in AI outbreaks in the long time spread in poultry is largely outweighted by 
human driven factors, i.e. movements of poultry, poultry products and fomites 
(Wiethoelter et al., 2015).  
Transmission of AIVs from the wild bird reservoir to poultry may occur as a result of direct 
or indirect contact. By sharing the same water body, wild birds may transmit AIVs to 
domestic waterfowl. Indeed, the presence of scavenging ducks and ducks raised in rice 
fields has been shown to be an important risk factor for H5N1 HPAI in South East Asia 
(Tiensin et al., 2005; Gilbert et al., 2006). A study using sentinel ducks placed on ponds in 
turkey-rearing areas in Minnesota showed a direct correlation between the infection in 
the sentinel ducks and the wild ducks at the monitoring sites. Moreover, AIVs were also 
isolated in the water (Halvorson et al., 1983). Turkey flocks were also monitored in the 
study. Surveillance results of a 4-year period showed that: 1) AI followed seasonal patterns 
in both sentinel ducks and turkeys, but usually with a 6-8 week delay in turkeys; and 2) most 
of the AIVs involved in the turkey outbreaks were also detected in the ducks and other 
avian species. These results suggest the transmission chain from wild waterfowl to 
domestic waterfowl via water bodies, and then to turkeys (Halvorson et al., 1983; Halvorson 
et al., 1985). Domestic waterfowl can also transmit the disease to chickens and other 
terrestrial poultry through commercial transportation and particularly at live bird markets 
(Senne et al., 2003; Sims et al, 2003; Yee et al., 2008). 
Direct transmission from wild birds to poultry can also occur, particularly in the case of 
outdoor free-ranging poultry (e.g. turkeys, chickens or ostriches) (Koch and Elbers, 2006), 
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and especially when these are situated on migratory waterfowl routes, near open storage 
of drinking water or artificial ponds, or in the absence of bird-proof feed stores (Lang, 1981; 
Alexander, 2000; Koch and Elbers, 2006). Also, because of the mixed backyard flocks that 
often include domesticated geese and swans, which may attract wild related species 
(Alexander, 2000). Feral birds are believed to play the role of a bridge species between wild 
waterfowl and poultry, although of course, the opposite also occurs, with wild birds, 
particularly feral birds, being affected following HPAI outbreaks in poultry (Alexander, 
2000). Wild birds may also become infected from poultry by feeding on infected poultry 
carcasses (Kwon et al., 2005) or, potentially, through the fertilization of fish ponds with 
poultry manure, which is widespread in Asia (Melville and Shortridge, 2006). 
Poultry and other land-based birds do not share water bodies, as oppose to aquatic wild 
and domestic birds. Therefore, AIV transmission among them occurs via different routes, 
i.e. direct contact with other infected poultry, or through fomites, i.e. people (e.g. farmers 
themselves or service providers), vehicles, and other inanimate objects such as cages 
moving from one farm to farm can vector the spread of AIV. Also contaminated feed or 
water may be involved. Live bird markets (Senne et al., 2003; Sims et al., 2003; Yee et al., 
2008), and unregulated backyard bird populations with low biosecurity (Meleigy, 2007; 
Chantong and Kaneene, 2011) play critical roles in AI spread. 
4.2.9. Between country spread  
A study by Kilpatrick et al. (2006) looking at the H5N1 HPAI introductions to countries 
worldwide found that, in Asia, 9 out of 21 introductions were most likely through poultry 
and 3 out of 21 through migratory birds. On the other hand, most introductions (20/23) in 
Europe were attributed to migratory birds, while it was more balanced for Africa (2/8 by 
poultry and 3/8 by migratory birds). 
Outbreaks in poultry via infections from migratory birds, as already discussed in the 
previous section, will be mostly related to farming in migratory routes, the farming of free-
ranging of domestic waterfowl, the presence of attractants in farms, and the existence of 
live bird markets.  
For the introduction via infected/contaminated poultry, poultry products or fomites, we 
have to consider that, a priori, the whole world is at risk due to globalized trade. 
Movements of infected poultry and their products can take place through both formal (van 
den Berg, 2009) and informal trade (mostly between neighbouring countries) (Beato et 
al., 2009). 
There are few documented cases of legal shipments infected with HPAI, since it is 
uncommon to import from high-risk countries. Still, an outbreak of H5N1 HPAI in Tibet was 
traced to a legal shipment of live chickens from Lanzhou (1,500 km away) (Normile, 2005). 
This may happen particularly if birds are moved during the pre-clinical phase of the 
infection. The transboundary spread of HPAI through the movement of live birds was 
reported in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany in 2003 (Beato and Capua, 2011). H5N1 
HPAI was also found during routine surveillance in duck meat legally imported from China 
to Japan (Mase et al., 2005). In 2005, imported birds destined for the UK pet market tested 
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positive for H5 HPAI at a quarantine station (DEFRA, 2005). In 2007, H5N1 HPAIV was also 
reported in Houbara bustards after importation into Saudi Arabia (Monne et al., 2008). 
The highest risk occurs through the informal trade of live birds, usually across the border of 
neighbouring countries. Because of their nature, these informal movements are difficult to 
trace. Sequencing of AIV has proven very useful in establishing links and tracing back 
possible sources of introduction (van den Berg, 2009). Examples of informal trade of wild 
birds include the finding of two mountain hawk eagles infected with H5N1 HPAI illegally 
imported to Belgium from Thailand (van Borm et al., 2005). Similarly, the Taiwanese 
authorities discovered a container from China with 1,037 exotic birds infected with H5N1 
HPAIV (ProMED, 2005). 
The trade of products represents a low risk. Although AIVs have been isolated following 
field or experimental studies in almost any poultry product, the fact that they are generally 
heat-processed before consumption decreases considerably the risk for poultry outbreaks 
or zoonotic infections. Field studies have found H9N2 LPAIV in imported chicken carcasses 
from China to Japan (Kishida et al., 2004), H5N1 HPAIV in duck meat from China to South 
Korea (Tumpey et al., 2002) and from China to Japan (Mase et al., 2005), H5N2 HPAI in eggs 
collected at an outbreak in Pennsylvania and Virginia, USA (Cappucci et al., 1985), and H5N1 
HPAIV in shell washes of duck and goose eggs from Viet Nam to China (Li et al., 2006). In 
addition, Yamamoto et al. (2007) showed experimentally the presence of H5N1 HPAIV in 
duck feathers.  
4.3. Prevention and control 
There is no effective treatment for AI. Therefore, preventing the entry of AIVs into poultry 
populations, and controlling and eradicating it as soon as it is detected are the best ways to 
minimise the impact of the disease. The prevention and control activities/measures involved 
can be implemented through either private or public initiatives, but reaching an optimal 
level generally requires a combination of both (Beach et al., 2006). Farmers play a key role, 
but they may need technical and financial support. Probably the most cost-effective 
measure, common to both prevention and control, but also surveillance, is the creation of 
awareness and the provision of information and technical assistance. This will help poultry 
producers to make efficient decisions in the adoption of prevention and control measures. 
Awareness raising and training of all relevant stakeholders is a cross-cutting approach that 
will have a direct impact in the implementation on all disease prevention, control and 
surveillance activities. Everyone in contact with birds should be made aware, not just those 
taking care of the birds, but also further along the poultry market chain, i.e. those involved 
in the transport, marketing and butchering of birds, as well as service providers (e.g. private 
veterinarians, feed distributors, etc.). 
Producers, particularly backyard farmers, need to be aware of the potential severity of AI, 
as well as the clinical presentation and the need to report suspected outbreaks to the 
authorities (i.e. passive surveillance), particularly since farmers may accept significant 
poultry losses as “normal” in many developing countries (Rushton et al., 2005). Information 
on measures to reduce the likelihood of infection (i.e. biosecurity), the importance of acting 
quickly to contain outbreaks and the importance to protect themselves (i.e. the zoonotic 
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risk), should also be provided. Even information on the control policy, e.g. stamping out, 
vaccination, compensation and restocking will help farmers to understand their role in the 
whole process and be more willing to cooperate. 
The development and dissemination of this kind of information may be provided through 
extension and outreach services, mostly by public authorities (sometimes also NGOs), 
rather than by the private sector. This information will lower the private cost of prevention 
and control measures for producers by reducing the time and human capital needed to 
identify and adopt them (Beach et al., 2006). 
A number of different approaches can be used for the delivery of this information, e.g. 
leaflets, booklets, posters, TV and radio messages, meetings by religious leaders or village 
chiefs, etc. In some cases, however, a more thorough training is needed. As for awareness 
materials, there are multiple formats available, from distance learning on-line type of 
courses, to face-to-face traditional capacity building. Based on the assessment that there is 
a need to deliver information to large numbers of people, a train-the-trainer (TOT) model 
might be the best approach in some cases. These are programs designed for training 
people, who will in turn train others. Also known as “cascade training,” the TOT approach is 
commonly used in the fields of animal health, public health, and agricultural extension.  
The TOT approach has been used, in both developed and developing countries, for a whole 
range of issues such as Newcastle Disease vaccination in chickens, acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), asthma, care for disaster survivors, health promotion 
for childbearing, promotion and risk reduction in pregnancy, neonatal intensive care, and 
the use of pesticides by farmers (Williams, 1978; Lowe, 1988; Anonymous, 1991; 
Anonymous, 1994; Armstrong, 1999; Oswalt and Boyce, 2000; Burgess et al., 2001; Gennaro 
et al., 2001; Slutsky and Bryant-Stephens, 2001; Alders et al., 2002; Gennaro et al., 2002; 
Tetteh et al., 2005; Normile, 2007; Koffel and Reidt, 2015). There have been TOT programs 
focusing on H5N1 HPAI, like Avian Flu School, which covered all aspects related to the 
prevention and control of the disease and was implemented in several countries (Beltran-
Alcrudo et al., 2008), and a participatory surveillance TOT in Egypt (Rushton and 
Rushton, 2009). 
4.3.1. Prevention 
The risk of introducing AIV (or any other avian pathogen) to poultry (or other birds) is 
reduced by the adoption of good biosecurity practices, not just at farm, but at each and 
every step of the poultry market chain. Special attention should be paid at small 
commercial and backyard premises, which are characterized by low biosecurity standards, 
and at live bird markets, which bring together domestic (and sometimes also wild birds) of 
different species and multiple sources. Although the same biosecurity concepts apply to 
them, specific sets of measures/manuals have been specifically developed for these 
settings (Nyaga, 2007). 
The purpose of biosecurity is two-fold. On the one hand, it is aimed at preventing any 
contact with potentially infected domestic or wild birds, mechanical vectors and fomites 
including feed and water sources (as described in the earlier section on between-host 
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transmission). On the other hand, biosecurity will slow down or stop the spread of the 
disease within the farm and to other premises or wild birds.  
Avoiding the contact with wild birds can be achieved by keeping poultry in closed housing 
and ensuring that wild birds cannot access poultry feed and water supplies. New poultry 
introduced into the farm should be first isolated/quarantined, and the access of people, 
vehicles or equipment should be limited and only allowed prior cleaning and disinfection or 
changes of clothing. One critical activity for AI spread is the transportation and marketing 
of poultry, especially at live bird markets. As a general rules, birds should not be returned to 
the farm from live bird markets. Other recommended biosecurity measures include the 
reduction of contamination by cleaning and disinfection, or the practice of all-in/all-out 
production systems. 
Biosecurity is also a concept that can be applied at the national level. Measures may include 
trade regulations and quarantines restricting the importation of live birds and bird 
products, and the implementation of government policies restricting outdoor rearing of 
birds, or closure of live bird markets during high risk periods. These measures should be 
dynamic according to the risk situation, as assessed via the risk analysis of all potential 
routes of entry and spread (Zepeda and Salman, 2003; Murray, 2004). The OIE Terrestrial 
Animal Health Code also provides detailed guidelines (OIE, 2015a). Regulatory and 
quarantine services should be equipped to effectively intercept foodstuffs and other risk 
materials at international airports, seaports and border crosses. Confiscated risk materials 
should be destroyed or disposed, and never dumped where they can be accessed by 
scavengers (wild birds or humans).  
4.3.2. Control 
While guidelines for HPAI control have been clearly described and established, the situation 
with LPAI is often not that clear. However, there are four important reasons why LPAI 
outbreaks should be controlled: 1) LPAIV infections may cause significant losses for 
commercial poultry producers; 2) H5 and H7 LPAIV strains can mutate to HPAIV; 3) AIVs may 
expand their host ranges to new species, including humans; and 4) LPAIV strains can 
contribute genetic material to HPAIV (Chin, et al., 2002). Although there is no disagreement 
that LPAI should be swiftly controlled, there are often no government policies (Halvorson, 
2002). Therefore, control measures such as stamping out or vaccination are only sometimes 
applied to non-H5/H7 LPAIVs outbreaks (Senne, 2007). 
In any case, the control measures against AI can be classified as follows: 
4.3.2.1. Depopulation and disposal 
Stamping out consist on the culling of infected animals, plus usually also in contact 
animals, and even neighbouring premises or dangerous contacts. The slaughter of 
animals must be conducted in a humane way, i.e. respecting animal welfare. After 
stamping out is completed (if possible on-site), carcasses must be disposed of also on-
site in a safe manner, i.e. burnt, buried or composted to prevent carcasses utilized for 
consumption, and to avoid scavenging animals accessing them (Martin et al., 2006). The 
disposal of very large numbers of birds in a short time presents major logistic, but also 
environmental problems. The destruction of carcasses should be followed by the 
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thorough cleaning and disinfection of all premises, vehicles and equipment. The manure, 
feathers and feed should be removed and if the floor is earthen, the top of the soil 
should be removed (OIE, 2009). Following cleaning and disinfection, depopulated 
premises should not be restocked for 21 days at least (OIE, 2009), and it is advisable to 
start with a small number of sentinel poultry first to be monitored daily before full 
repopulation (Martin et al., 2006). 
The single most important challenge arising from stamping out is that farmers will reject 
to have their animals killed in the absence of timely and adequate forms of 
compensation in place. The absence of compensation may lead to 1) outbreaks not being 
reported; 2) emergency slaughter by farmers either for their own consumption or sale; 
3) hiding of animals or their movement to other premises; or 4) inappropriate carcass 
disposal in areas accessible to scavengers. Therefore, no stamping out should be applied 
in the absence of a sound compensation program. For further information on how to 
establish a good practice for compensation as part of HPAI stamping-out strategies, 
there are guidelines available (Delgado et al., 2006). 
While HPAI-infected poultry flocks are usually depopulated and disposed, the measures 
taken with LPAI-infected flocks may vary with the virus and the country’s legislation. 
H5 and H7 strains are sometimes dealt with as if they were HPAI, regardless of their 
pathogenicity. For LPAI, rather than stamping out, controlled marketing of infected and 
vaccinated flocks is applied as a means to reduce bird density in an area to limit disease 
transmission (Halvorson, 2002). 
4.3.2.2. Movement controls 
Following an outbreak or suspected case, strict quarantines should be imposed on the 
premises (both those infected and those under suspicion) as soon as possible, i.e. no 
movement of birds, meat and potentially infected materials allowed off the property. No 
one should leave the farm without changing (or disinfecting) clothes and footwear and 
pets should be confined. The idea behind movement control is to prevent disease 
spread. Its success depends on the early identification of the index flock and the tracing 
of all movements off infected farms.  
When applied to a whole area or territory, effective quarantine and movement control 
requires continuous monitoring, patrolling, etc. by the police or military forces to ensure 
that only authorised personnel are allowed to enter and supervise the movements of 
residents. A type of movement control is the temporary closure of live bird markets, 
which has been often used in the control of H5N1 HPAI in Asia, as well as any other bird 
concentrations in the outbreak area, e.g. cockfighting, pigeon racing. etc. (Martin et 
al., 2006). 
4.3.2.3. Vaccination 
Vaccination can be useful to prevent disease and death (by reducing the susceptibility of 
the population), increase resistance to infection, and reduce (although not eliminate) 
virus replication, shedding and transmission (Marangon et al., 2008). Emergency 
vaccination can be an alternative to culling and to protect valuable species such as zoo 
birds. Vaccination is a costly and logistically demanding endeavour. For a successful 
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vaccination program, numerous factors should be taken into account: the bird density, 
predominant production systems, virus strain, and the availability of vaccine, equipment 
and personnel.  
The decision to vaccinate has to be carefully analysed, because of the associated 
implications in terms of 1) disease freedom declarations and re-establishment of trade 
(since many countries will not import poultry products from countries that vaccinate); 
2) the phenomenon known as silent spread related to the fact that even the best 
vaccines do not provide sterilizing immunity and vaccinated birds continue to shed, 
despite being protected from infection; 3) vaccine-resistant isolates can emerge; and 
4) the difficulty to differentiate vaccinated birds from naturally infected birds. Regarding 
the latter, it can be overcome by the use of DIVA strategies (differentiating infected 
from vaccinated animals) (Marangon et al., 2008), although they are difficult to 
implement. Vaccination has been used as part of control efforts in a number of LPAI and 
HPAI outbreaks all over the world (Marangon et al., 2008). 
4.3.2.4. Zoning and compartmentalization 
Both concepts apply to the establishment of animal subpopulations defined on a 
geographical basis (using natural, artificial or legal boundaries) in the case of zoning, or 
by management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity in the case of 
compartmentalization, e.g. to separate the high biosecurity commercial sector from the 
low biosecurity backyard (OIE, 2015a). Where the disease is already present, but only in 
part of a country, zoning becomes an important strategy towards progressive 
elimination or eradication efforts. For zoning to be applied, it is key for the national 
authorities to be able to establish infected and disease-free zones and enforce tight 
controls on the movement of poultry and products between zones. Zoning and 
compartmentalisation are aimed to facilitate the implementation of control measures 
while maintaining trade to some level.  
4.4. Surveillance 
The Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the OIE defines surveillance as the systematic 
ongoing collection, collation, and analysis of information related to animal health and the 
timely dissemination of information so that action can be taken (OIE, 2015a). The objective 
is to detect and monitor changes in health-related events in a defined animal population 
with specific predetermined goal/s, the most important being: 1) to detect disease 
incursions; 2) to describe the spatio-temporal distribution of the disease to inform 
prevention and control efforts; 3) to assess the progress of control or eradication efforts, 
e.g. vaccination campaigns; 4) to demonstrate disease freedom (for trade purposes); or 
5) to monitor antigenic drift. 
Surveillance strategies for AI vary from country to country and over time, depending on the 
infection and risk status of the country concerned, and whether dealing with HPAI, 
reportable LPAI or LPAI. Because of their economic impact, all HPAIVs in poultry should be 
reported to the OIE. The same goes for all H5 and H7 LPAIVs, due to the possibility they may 
become HPAIVs through mutation. Surveillance in these cases must be closely linked with a 
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clear response, e.g. stamping out, movement restrictions, etc. This is not the case for non-
reportable LPAI, for which there is no mandatory international regulation.  
In any case, surveillance strategies should include activities to monitor wild bird populations 
and poultry using a combination of passive and active approaches. For example, for an 
HPAI surveillance strategy, it may be appropriate to rely on passive (i.e. clinical) 
surveillance for chickens or turkeys, which usually exhibit clear clinical signs, and use active 
(virological and serological) surveillance to target species that may not show clinical signs 
(e.g. ducks or geese) (OIE, 2015a). Regardless of the surveillance approach, the 
characteristics of the diagnostic tests to be employed (e.g. sensitivity and specificity) 
should be carefully considered in the design, sample size determination and interpretation 
of results (OIE, 2012). 
FAO has listed the minimum requirements for effective surveillance (FAO, 2004): 
- HPAI must be notifiable; 
- The official veterinary services must have a formal system for detecting, investigating and 
reporting internationally, in accordance with OIE guidelines; 
- To have the technical capability to diagnose; 
- To have a system for recording, managing and analysing surveillance data; 
- To participate in the regional surveillance and diagnostic network; 
- A minimum frequency of surveillance of six months. 
When considering HPAI, the main goal of the surveillance strategies of free countries will be 
early detection that allows an early response. Passive surveillance will be paramount, 
relying on the reporting of unusual mortalities in domestic poultry and wild birds. Countries 
will need access to detailed and updated information on the risks of introduction through 
different routes, in order to focus their surveillance efforts at the highest risk points (Martin 
et al., 2006). Sites and populations were some active surveillance could be implemented at 
times of high risk, depending on the most likely route of introduction, include borders and 
international entry points (particularly next to infected countries), domestic waterfowl, and 
live bird markets (FAO, 2004). 
Infected countries will instead have some or all of the following surveillance goals: 
1) description of the spatio-temporal distribution of the disease to inform prevention and 
control efforts; 2) assessment of the efficacy of vaccination campaigns and other control 
programmes; 3) monitoring of antigenic drift; and, eventually, 4) seeking free status. 
Infected countries, while still mostly relying on passive surveillance, will need to step up 
their active surveillance efforts, particularly following outbreaks (tracing back and forward 
as part of outbreak investigation protocols). In addition to the high risk areas and 
populations already mentioned for free countries (borders and international entry points, 
domestic waterfowl and live bird markets), the monitoring of sentinel villages may also be 
considered (FAO, 2004). Infected countries should perform the molecular characterization 
of all isolates and molecular epidemiological studies, send isolates to international 
reference laboratories, and upload molecular data to international gene sequence 
databases (e.g. Genbank) (FAO, 2004). The Terrestrial Animal Health Code provides 
information on the specific surveillance requirements when there are ongoing AI 
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vaccination campaigns. The Code also provides specific guidelines related to possible 
strategies to seek recognition of disease free status for a country, zone or compartment, 
both for historically free countries and after an outbreak (OIE, 2015a). 
Surveillance activities can be a very expensive endeavour (i.e. personnel, fuel, vehicles, 
equipment and reagents), which can be extremely challenging for the developing countries 
mostly affected by AI. When dealing with limited, often insufficient budgets, cost-
effectiveness has to be considered as a top criteria when designing a surveillance program. 
Of all surveillance types, passive surveillance is the most cost-effective if implemented 
effectively (i.e. with the active cooperation of all poultry-related stakeholders). In addition, 
costs can be significantly reduced if surveillance tasks are combined with the 
implementation of other field activities like biosecurity assessment and improvement (Bunn 
et al., 2011). 
4.4.1. Surveillance in wild birds 
Infection in wild birds, although not mandatory, can still be reported to the OIE on a 
voluntary basis when detected with no impact on trade. 
Where there is a risk is of AI introduction from migratory birds, the first step is to identify 
the migratory patterns of different species (e.g. the origins, destinations and timing of 
migration) (Martin, Forman et al., 2006). Wild bird surveillance can be considered an early 
warning system and a way to estimate the risk of AI entry into poultry from infected wild 
birds. Wild bird surveillance has three components: 1) sampling of wild birds found dead or 
sick; 2) targeted capture and sampling of defined wild bird species during the period of 
migration; and 3) sampling of hunter-killed birds.  
The former refers to passive surveillance, which should be strengthened by alerting and 
training wildlife personnel and others in contact with wildlife (e.g. hunters, hikers, etc.) in 
designated (high risk) surveillance areas to report unusual deaths or sickness in wild birds,. 
This applies specifically to some HPAIVs like the current H5N1 HPAI, since most AIVs in wild 
birds do not cause disease or mortality. Reports should be investigated and wild birds 
found dead or sick with influenza-like symptoms should be sampled, for the samples sent to 
the national reference laboratory for virological diagnosis. 
Active surveillance of wild birds involves the sampling of (apparently) healthy animals, 
either captured or hunted. Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs or fresh faecal samples are the 
recommended methods for live birds. By finding out the prevalence of LPAIVs (particularly 
those of the H5 and H7 subtypes) in wild birds, it becomes possible to estimate the 
likelihood of transmission from infected wild birds into poultry. Active surveillance targets 
those wild birds species most likely to harbour AIVs, i.e. Anseriformes and Charadriiformes. 
Also, sampling juvenile birds will increase the number of viruses isolated (Stanislawek et al., 
2002). Virological assays only give positive results if the animal was sampled during an 
active AIV-infection. On the other hand, serology, although not yet optimized for wild birds, 
could be used to assess longer term past exposure to AIVs (Charlton et al., 2009). Although 
results from these active surveillance programs can be very valuable from a scientific point 
of view, the low rate of positive samples (rarely above 2%) and the high costs involved 
means that it is not a very cost-efficient activity and resources may be best reallocated 
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elsewhere when budgets are tight. In fact, active surveillance of wild birds is no longer 
compulsory in the EU since 2011 onward s (AHVLA, 2013). 
An interesting study evaluated a number of methods to detect H5N1 HPAI in wild 
waterfowl: live bird trapping, hunter-killed birds, birds caught in fishing nets, dead birds 
found by the public, catching live mute swans, and using sentinel flocks of mallards. Results 
showed that sampling dead birds found by the public and sentinel surveillance were the 
most sensitive approaches, while trapping live birds was least cost-effective (Knight-Jones 
et al., 2010). 
4.4.2. Surveillance in poultry 
4.4.2.1. Passive surveillance 
Passive surveillance in poultry is based on the obligatory reporting of AI suspicions to 
the authorities, i.e. an official veterinarian or the competent authority, and is therefore 
based on clinical surveillance, i.e. the detection of clinical signs at the flock level. In any 
case, passive surveillance should be followed up by sampling for the laboratory 
confirmation (i.e. virological analysis) of the clinical diagnosis. Recommended samples 
include dead birds and tracheal/oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs focusing on sick birds. 
Strict movement restrictions should be imposed upon any suspected premises until 
avian influenza is ruled out (OIE, 2015a). 
Raising awareness on avian influenza (e.g. on the risk, clinical signs, how to prevent its 
entry, etc.) is critical to increase the reporting of suspected outbreaks, and thus the 
effectiveness of passive surveillance. Everyone in contact with birds should be made 
aware, not just those taking care of the birds, but also further along the poultry market 
chain, i.e. those involved in the transport, marketing and butchering of birds, as well as 
service providers (e.g. private veterinarians, feed distributors, etc.). Awareness 
campaigns and trainings can be used to strengthen passive surveillance in areas where 
poultry is perceived to be at a higher risk, e.g. where migrating birds congregate.  
Having in place a fair and timely compensation plan (in the event the suspicion turns out 
to be positive) will also be critical to encourage reporting, as discussed in the prevention 
and control section above. 
For HPAI, passive surveillance has been shown to work well due to the obvious clinical 
signs (e.g. massive mortalities) that result from infection. Passive surveillance 
constitutes the single most important and cost-effective approach both for HPAI-free 
and infected countries. However, for LPAI, where clinical signs may be inapparent, very 
mild, or nonspecific, conventional passive surveillance will not be efficient.  
4.4.2.2. Syndromic surveillance  
Syndromic surveillance, a very novel approach of passive surveillance, is defined as “the 
(near) real-time collection, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of health-related data 
to enable the early identification of the impact - or absence of impact - of potential threats” 
(Triple-S, 2015). Syndromic surveillance is not based on laboratory-confirmed diagnosis, 
but on non-specific clinical signs and proxy measures for health. Other characteristic of 
syndromic surveillance is that the data are generally not collected for surveillance 
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purposes, and are often automatically generated (Triple-S, 2015). An alert will be 
prompted when the recommended trigger point or threshold is reached. If combined 
with a rapid laboratory diagnosis, syndromic surveillance can be a very effective and fast 
early detection system (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al., 2009). Because of the innate 
characteristics of syndromic surveillance (i.e. it does not rely on laboratory testing and 
data are generated for a purpose other than surveillance), it can be a very cost-effective 
approach (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al., 2009; Rodríguez-Prieto et al., 2015; Triple-S, 2015). In 
addition, it can cover multiple threats at once, i.e. changes in production parameters 
may be indicative of multiple diseases.  
Syndromic surveillance has been extensively used in human health (van den Wijngaard, 
2010), and since around 2006, it is also being used for animal health purposes 
(Rodríguez-Prieto et al., 2015). Only within Europe, 27 veterinary projects and systems 
have been identified (Triple-S, 2015). Syndromic surveillance can use production data, 
but also data from veterinary clinics, veterinary pharmacies, diagnostic laboratories, live 
animal markets, or slaughterhouses (Gates et al., 2015). Production data have been 
proven particularly useful to detect avian influenza outbreaks in commercial/intensified 
poultry settings, where production parameters get systematically recorded on a very 
regular and frequent basis. Mortality changes in poultry were used to detect H7N7 HPAI 
in the Netherlands andother HPAI (Elbers et al., 2007; Malladi et al., 2011). However, it is 
for LPAI, where syndromic surveillance becomes particularly useful. Slight changes of 
production parameters, such as increased mortality, reduced feed and water 
consumption, clinical (respiratory) signs or a drop in egg production or quality, may be 
the only indication of LPAIV infection (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al., 2009; OIE, 2015b). These 
would not be picked up by conventional passive surveillance. However, syndromic 
surveillance can build on them. In fact, a syndromic surveillance system based on the 
monitoring of mortality and egg production changes, was shown to be effective in the 
(retroactive) detection of H6N2 LPAI in layers (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al., 2009). 
4.4.2.3. Parameter monitoring 
Parameter monitoring, although still very experimental, could also be an effective 
approach for AI early detection, including LPAI. Also considered a type of passive 
surveillance, parameter monitoring is defined as the screening of biological indicators, 
e.g. animal termperature, animal activity, etc. (Rodríguez-Prieto et al., 2015). Promising 
examples include the use of audio sensor technology to monitor the pecking sounds (i.e. 
feeding behavior) of broilers (Aydin et al., 2014), or subcutaneously-implanted 
radiotelemetry units to monitor the heart rate and body temperatura in poultry 
(Kettlewell et al., 1997).  
A whole range of other innovative data streams measuring production parameters have 
been used to detect all sort of disease-related behaviours in other commercial livestock 
species, e.g. audio sensors to detect coughing noises in swine, cattle and horses or to 
monitor the feeding behavior of broilers, accelerometers to measure jaw movements as 
an indication of resting, eating, and ruminating periods, passive transponder tags 
attached to monitor feed intake in swine and cattle, electronic water flow meters to 
detect outbreaks of diarrhea in swine, etc. (Gates et al., 2015). 
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4.4.2.4. Active surveillance 
Active surveillance can be a very expensive endeavour, since it involves continuous 
sampling and testing, with the costs these activities involve in terms of personnel, 
equipment and reagents. This is why early detection in HPAI-free countries is mainly 
based on passive surveillance, which has been shown to be very effective due to the 
obvious clinical signs (e.g. massive mortalities). At periods of very high risk, such as 
when migrating birds are arriving or when sharing borders with an infected country, it 
might be useful to also undertake active serological and virological surveillance, 
especially domestic ducks, which are most likely to be exposed and often show no 
clinical signs (Martin et al., 2006). Infected countries will have to add outbreak 
investigations and active surveillance at high risk sites, e.g. live bird markets, backyard 
sector, etc. and perhaps the monitoring of sentinel villages or flocks. The frequency of 
active surveillance should vary according to the epidemiological situation in the country 
and/or the risk of introduction (OIE, 2015a). Therefore, to define the most appropriate 
surveillance strategy, it is advisable that countries perform and update risk assessments 
(Martin et al., 2006). 
A specific scenario when active surveillance becomes indispensable to detect AIVs is in 
the case of vaccinated flocks, when a DIVA surveillance strategy is required. There are 
several DIVA methods available, all of which involve active surveillance. These include 1) 
the placing and testing of marked and unvaccinated sentinel birds within vaccinated 
flocks; 2) using an heterologous vaccine (same HA but different NA), like in Italy, where 
they used a H7N3 heterologous vaccine against LPAI H7N1 (Capua et al., 2003); 3) using a 
subunit vaccine targeted to the HA that allows serologic surveillance to the internal 
proteins; and 4) measuring the serologic response to the non-structural protein 1 (NS1) 
(Suarez, 2005). 
For LPAI, clinical signs usually go unnoticed and thus undetected by passive surveillance, 
so active regular surveys of poultry populations are often the only way to detect these 
AIVs. Evidence of this was shown by an evaluation of different surveillance approaches 
in a vaccination and densely populated poultry area in Italy from 2000 to 2005, which 
showed active surveillance to be the most effective in detecting LPAIV infection, 
especially when a vaccination programme is in place (Comin et al., 2011). In the EU, 
member states must apply active surveillance programs that allow early detection and 
prevention of the spread of reportable LPAIVs in poultry (European Commission, 2008), 
before they have the chance of becoming widespread, transform into a highly 
pathogenic form, or become zoonotic. Blood samples from different poultry species 
have to be collected for serology and if antibodies are detected, the premises are visited 
again for viral detection (OIE, 2012; AHVLA, 2013). Apart from detecting sub-clinical LPAI 
infections, this surveillance plans contribute to the demonstration of a free status 
according to OIE rules (European Commission, 2008).  
The selection of farms may be done randomly (usually stratified), targeted (i.e. risk-
based) or a combination of both (e.g. sampling higher risk premises at a higher 
frequency than others) (Gonzales et al., 2010). Random sampling needs to be consistent 
with demonstrating the absence of infection at an acceptable level of confidence 
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(OIE, 2015a). For targeted sampling, risk factors used include type of production (e.g. 
outdoor), multi-age or multi-species flocks, lifepan, live bird markets, etc. (OIE, 2015a). 
Targeted surveillance has shown to be more effective than random surveillance at 
finding LPAIVs in the EU, particularly when targeting domestic waterfowl (Gonzales et 
al., 2010). The same study found as well that EU countries that sampled more holdings 
than required, as expected, also found more positive findings. Unlike for random 
sampling, where only serology is recommended as a first step, when conducting 
targeted sampling, it is advised to use concurrently a combination of both serology and 
virology methods for detection (OIE, 2012). 
4.4.2.5. Participatory epidemiology 
Participatory epidemiology (PE) is the systematic use of participatory approaches and 
methods to improve understanding of diseases and options for animal disease control 
(Catley et al., 2012). When PE is applied to disease search, it is known as participatory 
surveillance (PS), which is considered a type of active surveillance (Rodríguez-Prieto et 
al., 2015). Early applications of PS focused on pastoral communities e.g. for the 
Rinderpest eradication (Jost et al., 2007), but since then the approach has became 
widely applied in response to the H5N1 HPAI panzootic in Asia and Africa.  
In 2006, PS for HPAI was first implemented in Indonesia as a pilot programme in twelve 
districts (Jost et al., 2007). It was was rapidly scaled-up covering 31 provinces and 
2,000 staff by 2009 (Azhar et al., 2010), showing HPAI was endenic all over the country 
(Mariner et al., 2014). The sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic procedure (clinical 
case definition followed by a rapid test) was 84% and 100%, respectively (Robyn et 
al. 2012). With reducing donor funding, it became paramount to decrease costs and 
increase efficiency. As a result, other livestock diseases were incorporated and the 
system started focusing on responding to passive reports rather than actively searching 
for outbreaks (Mariner et al., 2014). The latter could be done thanks to the improved 
trust between communities and veterinary services that resulted from PS and 
encouraged outbreak reporting (i.e. passive surveillance), meaning that it may not be 
needed to carry PS as a routine (Mariner et al., 2014). 
The Early Detection, Reporting and Surveillance for Avian Influenza in Africa Project 
(EDRSAIA) started in 2008 in 11 countries in West and East Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda). 
Although no HPAI outbreaks were detected (since the disease was not present in most 
countries), countries found PS to be an important tool that increased confidence on the 
absence of HPAI and that could be applied for other diseases (Mariner et al., 2014). Also 
Sudan applied PS to look both into HPAI and Newcastle disease, finding that the latter 
was be very common (Mariner et al., 2014). 
In Egypt, the PS program started in 2008, with the first HPAI cases being reported in 
2009 (57 out of 88 suspected cases in that year). The program was applied in 15 out of 
28 governorates (those at high or medium HPAI risk) (Rushton and Rushton, 2009). The 
program is now fully integrated into the veterinary services and has been used for foot 
and mouth disease as well (Mariner et al., 2014). 
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Since PS relies mostly on clinical signs being noticeable by the poultry keeper, it may not 
be so useful for LPAI, given that clinical presentations are often very mild or unapparent. 
4.4.2.6. Sentinel surveillance 
Sentinel surveillance is defined as the repeated collection of information from the same 
selected sites or groups of animals to identify changes in the health status of a specified 
population over time (Rodríguez-Prieto et al., 2015). Sentinel flocks have been used for 
both LPAI and HPAI. 
In Victoria, Australia, for example, 10 sentinel free-range chicken flocks are maintained in 
areas populated by large numbers of waterfowl (East et al., 2010). In California, backyard 
flocks within one mile of 22 commercial turkey flocks were tested for avian diseases, 
although no AIV was isolated (McBride et al., 1991). An interesting study during a 4-year 
period in Minnesota used sentinel turkey flocks, but also sentinel ducks (isolation-reared 
mallards) placed in ponds to monitor AI in wild birds sharing the same water bodies ( 
Halvorson et al., 1983; Halvorson et al., 1985). A similar field experiment, also using 
domestic ducks, was performed with comparable results in an island in the Baltic Sea 
(Sinnecker et al., 1982). The use of sentinel flocks of mallards to detect H5N1 HPAI in wild 
waterfowl was more recently evaluated in Lake Constance (between Switzerland, 
Germany and Austria) and turned out to be the most cost-effective of all methods tried 
(Knight-Jones et al., 2010). General disadvantages of sentinel flocks include the expense 
of rearing disease-free birds, pen construction and husbandry, and the fact that sentinel 
flocks can be subject to predation and human disturbance (Deliberto et al., 2009). 
Sentinel birds are useful when restocking, i.e. it is advisable to start with a small number 
of poultry first to be monitored daily before full repopulation (Martin et al., 2006). The 
use of sentinel birds for vaccination has already been discussed above. In addition, 
sentinel birds placed in commercial poultry flocks infected with LPAI could be effective 
in the detection of the potential mutation of the virus into a highly pathogenic form 
(Verdugo et al., 2005).  
4.4.3. Laboratory diagnosis (extracted from OIE Terrestrial Manual, Chapter 2.3.4) 
Samples taken from dead birds should include faeces or cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs. 
In the case of HPAI, samples from other organs may be collected and processed either 
separately or as a pool. Samples from live birds should include both tracheal and cloacal 
swabs. For small delicate birds, the collection of fresh faeces can be an alternative. The 
samples should be placed in isotonic phosphate buffered saline (PBS), pH 7.0-7.4, 
containing antibiotics. Similar swab samples can be pooled. When immediate processing is 
impracticable, samples may be stored at 4°C for up to 4 days, or at -80°C (without PBS) for 
more prolonged storage.  
For agent identification, the following tests can be performed:  
- Virus isolation: It is performed by the inoculation of specific pathogen free (SPF) 
embryonated chicken eggs, or specific antibody negative (SAN) eggs. Although it is 
considered the “gold standard”, it is a laborious and time consuming technique, used 
mostly to diagnose the first clinical case or to obtain virus for further laboratory analysis. 
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- Antigen detection: There are several commercially available AC-ELISA kits that can detect 
the presence of any influenza A viruses in poultry within 15 min. However, they may lack 
sensitivity, may not have been validated for all bird species, they cannot identify the 
subtype, and the kits are expensive. 
- Direct RNA detection: RT-PCR techniques allow rapid detection and subtype 
identification, including a cDNA product that can be used for sequencing. The real-time 
RT-PCR is a modification to the RT-PCR that reduces the testing time and has a sensitivity 
and specificity equivalent to virus isolation, but may lack sensitivity when using faecal 
swabs, faeces and tissues in some bird species, because of the presence of PCR 
inhibitors that result in false-negative result. 
The following serological tests are used: 
- Enzyme-linked immunoassay (ELISA): Several commercial competitive ELISA (AIV C-ELISA) 
and blocking ELISA (AIV B-ELISA) kits that detect antibodies against the nucleocapsid 
protein have been developed and validated as a more sensitive alternative to the AGID 
test. ELISA kits are of moderate cost and are suitable for high throughput screening, but 
all positive results must be followed by HI test for subtyping. Lately, some subtype-
specific ELISA kits are becoming available. 
- Agar-gel immunodiffusion (AGID): AGID tests detect the presence of antibodies to any 
influenza A virus. They have been widely and routinely used in chicken and turkey flocks, 
but they are less reliable in other avian species. The AGID is a low cost serological 
screening test for detection of generic influenza A infections, but must be followed by HI 
tests for subtyping.  
- Haemagglutination (HA) and haemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests: Different 
laboratories use variations in the procedures for HA and HI tests. The HI test is primarily 
used to determine the subtype. While chicken sera rarely give nonspecific positive 
agglutination reactions, sera from other species may do so, meaning that some prior 
steps to prepare the sera are needed. The neuraminidase-inhibition test has been used 
to identify the NA type of isolates as well as to characterize the antibody in infected 
birds. This latter application is very valuable in DIVA strategies. Since it requires 
specialized expertise and reagents, this testing is usually done in an OIE Reference 
Laboratory.  
To be kept in mind that positive AIV antibody test results can also result from 
vaccination against avian influenza, maternal antibodies (up to four weeks of age), and 
because of a lack of specificity of the test (OIE, 2012). 
Apart from having the appropriate technology, a laboratory needs to ensure it has the 
capacity to handle a large number of samples in the event of an emergency, as well as 
access to international expertise to confirm any positive results and further 
characterization of isolates (Martin et al., 2006). 
  
30   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
Objectives   |    31 
5 Objectives 
 
5.1. General objective  
The general objective of this PhD Thesis is to propose cost-effective tools and 
strategies for the early detection of Avian Influenza in poultry. 
5.2. Specific objectives  
In order to achieve this general objective, the following specific objectives have 
been proposed: 
1. To assess the importance of avian influenza as one of the most important global 
threats of animal health. 
2. To quantitatively characterize published literature on the infectious diseases at 
the wildlife-livestock interface to identify where research on this topic has been 
focused, analyzing more specifically the case of avian influenza. 
3. To develop a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, expandible and sustainable 
training approach for all stakeholders involved in the surveillance, prevention 
and control of HPAI. 
4. To define the benefits and suggest a stepwise approach for the integration of 
the implementation of surveillance field activities with other field activities, like 
biosecurity improvements. 
5. To develop and evaluate an early warning system based on syndromic 
surveillance for LPAI in commercial egg production farms. 
  
32   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
Material and methods   |   33 
6 Material and methods 
  
This PhD Thesis is a compilation of scientific papers. Therefore, the materials and 
methods described below are those used specific for each of the papers. 
6.1. Main animal disease threats in 2010: pathogen types, drivers and 
challenges 
EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin 2011 
The identification of the most important pathogens was done through the author’s 
professional experience working at FAO, and more specifically with the Global Early 
Warning System (GLEWS), which is a joint system that builds on the added value of 
combining and coordinating the alert and disease intelligence mechanisms of OIE, 
FAO and WHO, through sharing of information, epidemiological analysis and joint 
risk assessment. In addition, the author consulted FAO colleagues in headquarters 
and in the field for their validation. 
6.2. Global trends in infectious diseases at the wildlife-livestock 
interface 
PNAS 2015 
Standardized definitions and guidelines similar to ones available for systematic 
reviews are lacking for scoping reviews. To ensure an objective and comprehensive 
approach, this scoping study was largely based on a framework encompassing an 
iterative rather than linear process. It was conducted in four main steps: defining 
the research question, literature search, screening of search results, and analysis. 
Defining the research question 
The review question was structured according to a modified PICO principle 
(population, interest, and context) and defined as: ‘What is the current global state 
of knowledge based on published literature of infectious diseases at the wildlife-
livestock interface?’ Livestock was broadly defined as all non-aquatic, vertebrate 
animals (domestic as well as non-domestic) that are farmed in agricultural systems 
and holdings. Depending on the degree of human influence and supervision, wildlife 
can comprise feral domestic, captive wild as well as wild animals. All were included. 
Search terms for wildlife and livestock were derived from standard nomenclature 
volumes for mammals and birds and comprised the Latin genus or species name and 
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the common genus name. In addition, generic terms like ‘livestock’ or ‘wildlife’ were 
included to obtain publications that did not incorporate taxonomic nomenclature.  
This review focused on terrestrial mammals and birds. Livestock diseases listed in 
the 2013 OIE Code and diseases deemed important by the OIE Working Group on 
Wildlife Diseases were included. Disease search terms comprised common and 
scientific names of pathogens including abbreviations. Terms for geographic 
regions were composed of United Nations’ sanctioned names of countries, 
continents and geographical sub-regions as well as ecological regions and 
transboundary protected areas.  
Literature search 
The search strategy consisted of compiling four search strings, one for each 
category (wildlife, livestock, disease and geographic region) and combining these 
by the Boolean operator, ‘AND’, to obtain only the intersection. Prior to 
combination, all search strings were thoroughly tested and refined for each 
category separately to decrease the risk that publications were missed due to 
different spelling, notation, and nomenclature. The literature search was conducted 
through the platform Web of Knowledge (version 5.12). All databases were 
searched in English from their first entries to 2013, utilizing the topic search, which 
scans titles, abstracts, and keywords of each publication. Final searches were 
conducted between 9 and 10 January 2014. 
Screening of search results 
Obtained publication records were harmonized and merged into a Microsoft Access 
2013 database for further data cleansing and analysis. To check for duplicates, 
queries targeting identical digital object identifiers, database accession numbers, 
titles, authors, or first 50 characters of the abstract were performed. Publications 
without an abstract as well as publications clearly indexed either as review, 
editorial, or errata were excluded.  
With the aid of dynamic structured query language (SQL) statements and 
connecting tables between publications and search terms, all publications were 
automatically indexed with their corresponding search terms. In cases where no 
search term could be allocated, the abstract, title, and keywords of the respective 
record were checked manually. Publications without entries in each category 
(wildlife, livestock, disease and geographical regions) were excluded, as they did 
not meet the intersection criterion.  
Analysis 
Publications were analyzed by time according to year of publication as well as by 
diseases, interfaces, and continents to which they referred, recognizing that each 
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publication may refer to more than one search term within each category 
(e.g. > 1 continents) and that percentages may therefore surmount 100%. Dynamic 
intersection SQL queries were used to eliminate multiple counts (e.g. publications 
referring to a country and its respective continent). Where possible, publications 
were allocated to specific livestock groups or wildlife families; otherwise these 
publications were summarized under the category ‘generic terms’ and excluded 
from detailed analyses. For analysis of wildlife-livestock interfaces, only publications 
mentioning one disease were included to avoid false attribution between species 
and diseases. Results were visualized as maps and plotted using the lattice and 
ggplot2 packages in RStudio (version 0.97.310. RStudio, Inc. Boston, MA, USA). 
For each of the top-3 wildlife-livestock interfaces, piecewise models were fitted to 
estimate long-term trends in publication rates (1912-2013). First, a standard Poisson 
regression model was fitted to each series using the glm function in RStudio. 
Following this the model was re-fitted using the segmented function in the 
segmented package. This method takes into account potential piecewise linear 
relationships and provides estimates of approximate changepoints, i.e. years 
marked by abrupt changes in publication rates. Davies’ test was used to test for a 
significant difference in slope before and after the estimated changepoint.  
6.3. Avian flu school - a training approach to prepare for H5N1 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza 
Public Health Reports 2008 
The pilot training courses 
During the initial assessment period, three pilot courses were conducted: one in 
Davis, USA (July 2006) with 17 participants (4 instructors, 13 trainees); one in 
Morogoro, Tanzania (August 2006) with 37 participants (5 instructors, 13 observers, 
1 coordinator, and 18 trainees); and one in College Station, USA (September 2006) 
with 29 participants (4 instructors, 4 observers, 1 coordinator, and 20 trainees). 
Additional courses were conducted in Djibouti (2), Tanzania (1), and USA (1), in 
addition to courses taught by other organizations based on Avian Flu School (AFS) 
materials.  
Course evaluation 
Participants were asked to complete pre- and post-course assessments of their 
knowledge and to evaluate their perceived improvement in comprehension of the 
subject matter. An additional evaluation form was completed by trainees at the end 
of each module, ranking the effectiveness of each module on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Moreover, at the end of each workshop there was a facilitated discussion about the 
course’s effectiveness and how to improve it. Ten months after the first pilot 
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workshop, an anonymous online survey was emailed to participants to report on 
their training activities, behavioral changes, whether they would change anything in 
the course, and their familiarity with the learning objectives.  
Training model 
A train-the-trainer model might be the best approach to deliver information to large 
numbers of people worldwide. AFS materials are designed in tiers based on the 
expertise of the audiences. In Tier I, professionals and national officials from public 
health ministries and veterinary services are trained. Tier I trainees then conduct 
Tier II trainings, mainly within their districts or organizations, e.g. district 
veterinarians, public health workers, etc. who will, at Tier III, reach their respective 
communities. Tier I trainers apply for AFS and are admitted to the course based on 
their qualifications and expertise (e.g., poultry health, public health, epidemiology), 
language skills, and willingness to travel (and are classified in a dataset by these 
characteristics). Tier II trainers are identified by their job functions, and Tier III 
trainees are identified by their interest and needs. 
Flexibility, lucidity and interactivity of the material 
The AFS curriculum was designed in a modular format so that it can be easily and 
quickly adapted to an audience’s needs by adding or removing modules and/or 
lessons.  
The materials are written in simple language using short statements and formatted 
as bulleted lists whenever possible. Technical jargon is avoided and complementary 
diagrams are presented. Trainers are instructed to speak slowly and clearly, 
stressing the most important concepts, and monitoring trainees for 
comprehension. This approach facilitates the comprehension and the teaching, also 
since many participants do not speak English as a first language, and the translation 
of materials (so far into French, Kiswahili, and Spanish).  
Lessons are highly interactive, mainly through the use of small group (3-5 people) 
review exercises, which present participants with hypothetical scenarios to practice 
the lessons’ main concepts. The groups discuss the exercise and then report back to 
the full workshop group for further discussion. The exercise answers are recorded 
and distributed by e-mail to all participants. Discussion is highly encouraged to help 
understanding concepts and clarifying misunderstandings, while keeping 
participants involved and interested.  
Relevance 
AFS courses usually include local guest speakers who present their own 
experiences, i.e. a presentation on the poultry sector in the host country, and on the 
implementation of the national HPAI Plan. Instructors are encouraged to use 
examples from their own experience.  
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Training materials 
Using existing documents in the public domain, an outline was developed to 
identify information gaps, and experts were enlisted to develop a text version of 
the materials to fill those gaps. The materials were then organized into short, 
highly interactive lessons by a commercial adult training firm (Info Pros, 
Sacramento, CA, USA). 
Content 
The complete AFS course consists of 3 days divided into four modules with short 
lectures and small group exercises, covering only information that is essential to 
understand AI. Half-day is dedicated to a practical session covering the applied skills 
related to the four modules. It is best taught in a location, such as a laboratory or 
outdoors, that allows the manipulation of live birds. Each module is supplemented 
with a list of the references, a feedback form, a short Microsoft PowerPoint 
presentation, and appendices covering specific standard operating procedures, 
exercises, case studies, and other complementary information. 
Structure 
All modules follow the same structure to aid in their ease of use. Instructors are 
provided the module contents, a description of the target audience, a suggested 
timeline, the module objectives, and the module preview, which stresses the key 
points of the lessons. The curriculum follows in short segments that include highly 
interactive review exercises.  
The course manual is structured into two columns: the left containing the 
instructors’ notes, and the right presenting the material for the participants. The 
instructor column includes the information to be taught, plus instructions, 
transitions and the course timeline. The participant column consists of highlighted 
key information, exercises, diagrams and space to take notes. Tier I participants are 
presented with both columns, while the manuals for Tiers II and III trainees show 
only the participant’s column. 
Each module has an accompanying slide show presentation with exercises, pictures, 
diagrams, and simple animations to help explain the most confusing concepts. 
Participants though focus on their manuals, so that the course can be taught in the 
absence of projection equipment or in the event of a power outage. 
Course schedule and setup 
It is recommended that full 3.5-day AFS courses be taught by a minimum of two 
instructors, one with a veterinary and poultry background and one other with a 
public health background. A third instructor with expertise in communication or 
national planning is helpful. The ideal number of trainees is between 10 and 15, with 
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varied professional qualifications, which helps them bring different perspectives 
during the interactive exercises. The AFS laboratory requires at least one instructor 
per four participants. 
Making the AFS materials available 
To support course workshops domestically and internationally, the AFS Assessment 
Project developed a website, (http://www.avianfluschool.org), which provides 
guidance for organizing a training, for ordering AFS course materials, for locating 
AFS instructors, etc. 
6.4. Integrating surveillance and biosecurity activities to achieve 
efficiencies in national avian influenza programs 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2011 
This was a letter to the editor. Therefore, no materials and methods were utilized. 
Rather, the authors used their own professional experience working with national 
authorities through Avian Flu School trainings and international work while working 
at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
6.5. A flock-tailored early warning system for low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI) in commercial egg laying flocks 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2009 
Data 
Daily mortality and egg production records from H6N2 LPAIV-infected flocks were 
obtained from 27 flocks on one commercial premises in Southern California that 
suffered an outbreak of H6N2 LPAI in 2002. Infection was confirmed by virus 
isolation from five submissions from different flocks. Subsequently, additional flock 
outbreaks were detected based on clinical signs (Woolcock, personal 
communication, 2009). The daily data available covered two months (January and 
February 2002), with the outbreak occurring during the second week of January. A 
flock was defined as hens of a single strain and age housed in a discrete building or 
structure. The hens were housed in cages on a multi-age egg production farm and 
birds were not vaccinated against AI. Information about the strain and age of the 
hens was also obtained. Seventeen flocks were affected during pre-molt production 
(9 flocks at 63 weeks of age and 8 flocks at 37 weeks of age) and the remaining 10 
between the first and the second molt, at 85 weeks of age. Mean flock size was 
25,040 birds (range = 8754 - 107,261). 
Because data from healthy flocks from the affected farm were not available, 
records were obtained from another company in Southern California to estimate 
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the baseline mortality and egg production trends for a standard flock. Data were 
checked for normality using the chi-square goodness of fit test. The comparison 
farm had no history of LPAI or any major disease event, had similar management 
practices, similar genetic strains, and was located in a similar environment in 
Southern California at around the same time. Forty-four commercial layer flocks 
housed between May 2002 and December 2004 in 20 poultry houses were selected. 
The hens were producing eggs up to 100–103 weeks of age, with one molt at around 
66 weeks of age. Mean flock size was 25,726 birds (range = 16,920–75,324). 
Data analysis 
Baseline mortality trends (when no LPAI is present) were calculated using data from 
all 42 flocks for both the pre- and the post-molting periods. Mortality data over the 
molting period were not included in the analysis. Because molting occurs at 
different times in each flock, post-molt mortality data were aligned to day 1 of the 
post-molt production. The calculation of the egg production trend required a 
different approach because the slope changes depending on the stage in the 
production cycle, first increasing steeply to a maximum, and then decreasing 
gradually until the molting period. A spline regression model was used, which allows 
the functional form of the relationship to change at one or more points along the 
range of the predictor (splines). Spline models were used with five and two knots 
for pre- and post-molt productions, respectively. Production data over the molting 
period were also excluded. Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, 
USA) was used to perform all calculations. 
Outbreak mortality and production data 
Mean daily mortality of the week prior the outbreak was used to estimate the initial 
baseline daily mortality. The expected mortality (if there were no outbreaks) was 
calculated by applying the mortality trend formulas (y = ax + b) shown in the results 
section, where b is the initial baseline daily mortality, x is time (days in production 
after the first week) and a is a trend coefficient. The daily mortality attributable to 
the outbreak was obtained by deducting the expected daily mortality from the 
observed daily mortality during the outbreak. 
A similar process was used for egg production data. First, the initial baseline daily 
egg production was calculated by averaging the records of the first week. Second, 
depending on when in the production cycle the outbreak occurred, the 
corresponding egg production trend was used to estimate the expected egg 
production (if there were no outbreaks). Third, the expected daily egg production 
was deducted from the observed daily egg production during the outbreak to 
calculate the daily egg production loss attributable to the outbreak. 
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Early Warning System (EWS) 
The EWS was designed in a spreadsheet. Two EWS scenarios were set up: EWS1, an 
alert threshold, which occurs when the observed mortality exceeds the expected 
mortality by more than a factor x in a single day; and EWS2, an alert threshold, 
which occurs when the observed mortality exceeds the expected mortality by more 
than a factor y during each of 2 consecutive days. One reason for implementing the 
EWS2 is to avoid a very common inaccuracy from poultry record keeping, which may 
arise because daily mortality counts occur at different times during the day. This 
anomaly will result in a higher number of false alerts from the EWS1. In addition, a 
combination of both types of alerts was also evaluated, i.e. having an alert when 
either of the two alert levels is exceeded. The same concept of 1- and 2-day EWSs 
were used for the production data. The EWSs (each individually and their 
combination) were tested with data from both LPAIV-infected and non-infected 
flocks. Three outcome criteria were used to evaluate/optimize the threshold levels: 
detection delay (DD) of an LPAI outbreak (in outbreak flocks), the percentage of 
false alerts (FAs) triggered (in non-outbreak flocks), and the percentage of LPAI 
outbreaks missed (in outbreak flocks). 
To evaluate/compare the EWS against fixed EWSs, and since no LPAI EWS was 
found in the literature, three EWS described by Elbers et al. (2007) to control the 
H7N7 HPAI epidemic in the Netherlands were adapted for LPAI by setting stricter 
alert levels.  
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7.1. EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin 2011 
Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo, Sergei Khomenko, Sherrilyn Wainwright, Jan 
Slingenbergh. Main animal disease threats in 2010: pathogen types, drivers and 
challenges. EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin 2011; 37: 2-13 
 
 
Resumen del artículo en castellano 
Principales amenazas de enfermedades animales en 2010: tipos de patógenos, 
transmisores y desafíos. 
Las enfermedades infecciosas animales pueden tener un gran impacto en la 
salud púlbica, la economía nacional y la cabaña ganadera. La emergencia de 
enfermedades está desencadenada por múltiples factores interrelacionados, 
que los servicios veterinarios necesitan tener en cuenta para asegurar un mejor 
control de las enfermedades a través de la incorporación de otras disciplinas 
relevantes como la economía y la sociología. Este artículo describe las 
principales amenazas de enfermedades animales descritas durante 2010, su 
transmisores y los desafíos que presentan. 
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7.2. PNAS 2015 
Anke K. Wiethoelter, Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo, Richard Kock, Siobhan M. Mora. 
Global trends in infectious diseases at the wildlife-livestock interface. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 2015; 
112(31): 9662-9667 
 
 
Resumen del artículo en castellano 
Tendencias globales en enfermedades infecciosas en la interacción entre 
poblaciones silvestres y producciones ganaderas 
El papel y la significación de la ecología de la interacción entre poblaciones 
silvestres y las producciones ganaderas han sido enormemente descuidados, a 
pesar del interés reciente en los animales como origen de enfermedades 
emergentes en humanos. La determinación del alcance de los métodos de 
revisión para evaluar objetivamente el interés relativo de la comunidad 
científica en las enfermedades infecciosas a nivel de la interacción entre 
animales silvestres y ganadería, para caracterizar las especies animales y las 
regiones implicadas, así como para identificar tendencias a lo largo del tiempo. 
Una extensa búsqueda bibliográfica combinando los términos fauna silvestre, 
ganadería, enfermedad y geografía permitieron localizar 78.861 publicaciones 
de las cuales 15.998 han sido incluidas en el análisis. Las publicaciones van de 
1912 a 2013 y muestran una tendencia creciente y continua, incluyendo un 
cambio desde las enfermedades parasitarias a las víricas a lo largo del tiempo. 
En particular hay un incremento significativo en las publicaciones sobre la 
interacción entre artiodáctilos-bovinos y pájaros-aves de corral desde 2002 y 
2003 respectivamente. Estas tendencias pueden ser atribuidas a eventos clave 
de enfermedades que han estimulado el interés público y la financiación para la 
investigación. Entre las 10 enfermedades más importantes identificadas en esta 
revisión la mayoría son zoonosis. La relación entre fauna silvestre y ganadería 
conlleva importantes interacciones entre grupos filogenéticamente próximos 
y/o simpátricos. La relación entre pájaros y aves de corral fue la citada con más 
frecuencia a nivel mundial con particularidades regionales. Esta revisión 
proporciona la visión más amplia de la investigación de las enfermedades 
infecciosas en el contexto de la relación entre fauna silvestre y ganadería 
realizada hasta la fecha. 
 
  
58   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
  
Publications    |    59 
 
 
 
60   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
 
 
Publications    |    61 
 
 
 
62   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
 
 
Publications    |    63 
 
 
 
 
64   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
 
 
 
Publications    |    65 
 
 
 
66   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
 
 
Publications    |    67 
 
 
 
68   |   PhD Thesis Daniel Beltrán Alcrudo 
 
 
 
Publications    |    69 
 
7.3. Public Health Reports 2008 
Daniel Beltran-Alcrudo, David A. Bunn, Christian E. Sandrock, Carol J. Cardona. 
Avian flu school: A training approach to prepare for H5N1 highly pathogenic avian 
influenza. Public Health Reports 2008; 123(3): 323-332 
 
 
Resumen del artículo en castellano 
Escuela de Gripe Aviar: Una aproximación formativa para prepararse frente a la 
influenza aviar altamente patógena H5N1 
Desde la reemergencia de la influenza aviar altamente patógena (H5N1 HPAI) 
en 2003, se ha desarrollado una pandemia que no tiene precedentes históricos 
en el número de explotaciones infectadas, la dispersión geográfica y as 
consecuencias económicas para la agricultura. La epidemia ha afectado a un 
amplio rango de aves y mamíferos, incluyendo humanos. La gestión ineficaz de 
los brotes, principalmente debida a la falta de conocimientos de los implicados 
en la detección, prevención y respuesta, apunta a la necesidad de realizar una 
formación específica sobre H5N1 HPAI. Los principales desafíos son el 
requerimiento de un enfoque multidisciplinar, la falta de expertos, la necesidad 
de formación a todos los niveles y la diversidad de posibles escenarios. La 
Escuela de Gripe Aviar (Avian Flu School ) afronta estos desafíos a través de un 
programa de tres niveles de formar al formador que intenta minimizar el 
impacto sanitario y económico de la H5N1 HPAI mediante la mejora de la 
capacidad de la comunidad para prevenir y responder, mientras se protegen a 
sí mismos y a los demás. El curso enseña los hechos que se necesitan conocer 
utilizando materiales flexibles, interactivos y relevantes. 
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7.4. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2011 
David Bunn, Daniel Beltran-Alcrudo, Carol Cardona. Integrating surveillance and 
biosecurity activities to achieve efficiencies in national avian influenza programs. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2011; 98: 292–294 
 
 
Resumen del artículo en castellano 
Integrando vigilancia epidemiológica y actividades de bioseguridad para 
alcanzar la eficiencia en programas nacionales de influenza aviar 
Basándose en la experiencia con la HPAI (Influenza Aviar Altamente Patógena), 
los esfuerzos para mejorar la capacidad global para prevenir y controlar 
enfermedades zoonóticas deberían considerar modelos nuevos y más 
eficientes para integrar las actividades de prevención y vigilancia. 
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7.5. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2009 
Daniel Beltran-Alcrudo, Tim E. Carpenter, Carol Cardona. A flock-tailored early 
warning system for low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) in commercial egg 
laying flocks. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2009; 92: 324–332 
 
 
Resumen del artículo en castellano 
Un sistema de alerta temprana a nivel de explotación para Influenza Aviar de 
Baja Patogenicidad (LPAI) en epxlotaciones comerciales de ponedoras. 
El objetivo de este estudio fue desarrollar y evaluar un sistema de alerta 
temprana (EWS) para explotaciones comerciales de ponedoras para detectar 
mortalidades leves y cambios en la producción de huevos que caracterizan las 
infecciones por virus de influenza aviar de baja patogenicidad (LPAIV). Un EWS 
generará una alerta cuando un punto de alerta recomendado se alcanza o se 
exceda. Anteriormente los EWS utilizados se basan en niveles fijos de alerta, 
mientras que el que proponemos personaliza el nivel de alerta para cada 
explotación. A pesar de que un enfoque fijo puede ser válido para 
enfermedades de alta patogenicidad, conlleva una baja probabilidad de 
detección en enfermedades de baja patogenicidad. El EWS se basó en la 
recogida diaria de datos de explotaciones afectadas por la epidemia de LPAI 
H6N2 ocurrida en California entre 2000 y 2004. Se evaluaron tres sistemas: 
EWS1 que alertaba cuando la mortalidad aumentaba o la producción disminuía 
más de x veces los valores diarios esperados (2.75–3.50 veces la mortalidad 
esperada), (2) EWS2, que alertaba cuando mortalidad aumentaba o la 
producción disminuía más de y veces  los valores diarios esperados durante 2 
días consecutivos (1.75–2.15 veces la mortalidad esperada), y una combinación 
de ambos. Los EWS fueron evaluados de acuerdo a tres parámetros: demora en 
la detección de un brote de LPAI (en días), falsas alertas (%) y brotes no 
detectados (%). Los resultados mostraron que en un sistema basado en la 
producción de huevos  no añade beneficios sobre uns sistema basado en la 
mortalidad, principalmente porque la disminución de la producción de huevos 
relacionada con H6N2 LPAI se produce siempre después de un incremento de la 
mortalidad.  
(Continúa) 
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Combinando ambos sistemas se consiguió reducir el tiempo de detección y se 
detectaron todos los brotes, pero a costa de un ligero incremento del número 
de falsas alertas. El sistema presentado en este estudio también llevó a cabo 
alertas basadas en valores fijos para los tres parámetros evaluados. El sistema 
propuesto, si se utilizara como parte de un programa de crianza cooperativo y 
se combinara con un diagnóstico laboratorial rápido, podría ser una 
herramienta útil para detectar y controlar los brotes de LPAI y otras 
enfermedades que afectan a las aves de corral. Construido sobre una hoja de 
cálculo, el sistema podría ser barato, sencillo y rápidamente incorporado en el 
sistema de toma de decisiones de granjas comerciales de producción de 
huevos. Además, el sistema propuesto puede ajustarse rápidamente a 
situaciones epidémicas cambiantes, y fácilmente personalizado para cada 
explotación.  
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8 General discussion 
  
8.1. Main animal disease threats in 2010: pathogen types, drivers and 
challenges 
EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin 2011 
Infectious animal diseases can have a major impact on public health (zoonoses), 
national economies (high-impact diseases), household livelihoods (enzootic 
diseases) and, in very serious cases, global societal stability and security 
(pandemics, bioterrorism...). Disease emergence is triggered by multiple, 
interrelated factors: human and animal demographics, climate change, increased 
mobility and globalization, urbanization, land degradation, drug resistance, and 
mass animal rearing. There are three main pathways for emerging disease 
pathogens to adjust host exploitation: pathogens as invaders into new territories; 
pathogens performing virulence jumps; and pathogens performing species jumps.  
Because of this complexity, a new approach is needed for disease prevention and 
control. Current approaches to animal disease prevention and control are based on 
the disruption of disease transmission. While these have proved effective in both 
short- and long-term disease control programmes, they have been less successful in 
some instances, as shown by the current persistence of H5N1 HPAI, despite 
significant national and international efforts. This is because most current 
approaches apply strong veterinary science and medicine disciplines in isolation 
from other relevant disciplines, without confronting the root causes of disease 
emergence at the animal-human-environment interface. Veterinary services need to 
expand into an agro-ecological approach. Also the international community is 
increasingly converging on such a multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary approach to 
addressing the increasing disease threats. This approach, termed “One World, One 
Health”, outlines a collaborative, international, cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary 
mode of addressing threats and reducing risks of infectious diseases at the animal-
human-ecosystem interface, including the wildlife component. 
The major disease threats are then analysed by geographical region (i.e. continent). 
One of the most worrying and expanding threats is avian influenza, particularly in 
south east and East Asia. H5N1 HPAI perhaps best illustrates the complexity of the 
factors involved in the local, national, regional and even global spread of a newly 
emerged animal pathogen. H5N1 HPAI has demonstrated what happens when a 
new virus enters a new host population (chickens) from where it can jump to 
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further species (human infections, illustrating how the virulence of an agent can 
vary), and what happens when a new virus can spread across very large distances to 
new susceptible populations. 
 
8.2. Global trends in infectious diseases at the wildlife-livestock 
interface 
PNAS 2015 
The role and significance of wildlife–livestock interfaces in disease ecology has 
largely been neglected, despite recent interest in animals as origins of emerging 
diseases in humans. However, no studies have sought to characterize the diseases 
and animals involved on a global level. An extensive literature search combining 
wildlife, livestock, disease, and geographical search terms yielded 78,861 
publications, of which 15,998 were included in the analysis, providing the most 
comprehensive overview of research on infectious diseases at the wildlife–livestock 
interface to date. Publications dated from 1912 to 2013 and showed a continuous 
increasing trend, including a shift from parasitic to viral diseases over time. Ten 
diseases, mostly zoonoses, have accounted for half of the published research in this 
area over the past century. Relatively few interfaces can be considered important 
from a disease ecology perspective. These findings suggest that surveillance and 
research strategies that target specific wildlife–livestock interfaces may yield the 
greatest return in investment. 
The bird–poultry interface was the most frequently cited wildlife–livestock interface 
worldwide, ranking first in Asia, Europe, and North America and second in Oceania, 
Africa, and South America. Of all publications citing a bird–poultry interface, avian 
influenza (AI) constituted the 22%. The magnitude of this result highlights the 
importance of the wildlife poultry interface for AI. However, time-series analysis 
revealed that the number of publications on AI was highly positively correlated with 
media coverage and research funding, highlighting the influence of specific disease 
events and sociopolitical–economic drivers of research in this area. Just because a 
certain wildlife–livestock interface is prominently reported in the scientific literature 
does not necessarily mean that actual transmission is frequently occurring at this 
interface. Avian influenza is an example where transmission at the wildlife–livestock 
interface is often implied, but a functional interface is seldom documented and 
proven. In fact, global spread of H5N1 was facilitated by poultry movement and 
trade without any proximal role of wild birds in some countries. 
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8.3. Avian flu school: A training approach to prepare for H5N1 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza  
Public Health Reports 2008 
Since the reemergence of H5N1 HPAI in 2003, a panzootic that is historically 
unprecedented in the number of infected flocks, geographic spread, and economic 
consequences for agriculture has developed. The epidemic has affected a wide 
range of birds and mammals, including humans. The ineffective management of 
outbreaks, mainly due to a lack of knowledge among those involved in detection, 
prevention, and response, points to the need for training on H5N1 HPAI. The main 
challenges are the multidisciplinary approach required, the lack of experts, the need 
to train at all levels, and the diversity of outbreak scenarios. 
Avian Flu School aimed to address these challenges through a three-level train-the-
trainer program intended to minimize the health and economic impacts of H5N1 
HPAI by improving a community’s ability to prevent and respond, while protecting 
themselves and others. The course teaches need-to-know facts using highly flexible, 
interactive, and relevant materials. 
 
8.4. Integrating surveillance and biosecurity activities to achieve 
efficiencies in national avian influenza programs 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2011 
Implementing HPAI prevention, surveillance and response national programs is a 
very expensive endeavour, typically far exceeding a developing country’s budgeted 
funds and thus requiring substantial donor support. Costs could be significantly 
reduced if some of the tasks within the various components were combined, 
particularly in the implementation of field activities.  
One of the most obvious synergies is between surveillance and biosecurity 
improvement activities, because: 1) Biosecurity and surveillance professionals must 
engage and train the same groups such as poultry keepers, live bird market 
managers, and poultry service providers; 2) Professionals implementing surveillance 
and biosecurity programs would benefit from cross training; 3) Biosecurity and 
surveillance professionals have overlapping tasks; and 4) Assessing biosecurity 
measures and gaps at surveillance sites provides key information for 
focusing/targeting surveillance. 
The H5N1 HPAI panzootic has highlighted the need to build capacity for disease 
prevention, detection and response preparedness. These efforts have encountered 
the enormous expenses of training, communication, personnel and equipment. 
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Cross-training among professional field staff, linking activities that require similar 
knowledge and engage the same groups, and integrating surveillance, biosecurity 
and other field activities will build more efficient disease prevention and 
surveillance programs. 
 
8.5. A flock-tailored early warning system for low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI) in commercial egg laying flocks  
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2009 
The aim of this study was to develop and evaluate an early warning system (EWS) 
for commercial egg laying flocks to detect the subtle mortality and egg production 
changes that characterize LPAI infections. An EWS will create an alert when the 
recommended trigger point is reached or exceeded. Previously used EWSs are 
based on fixed alert levels, while the proposed EWS customizes the alert level to 
each flock. While a fixed approach may be valid for highly pathogenic diseases, it 
results in a lower detection probability for low pathogenic diseases.  
The EWS was based on daily data collected from flocks affected by the 2000–2004 
H6N2 LPAI epidemic in California. Three EWSs were evaluated: (1) EWS1 is triggered 
when the observed mortality increase or production decrease exceeds more than X 
times the expected daily value, (2) EWS2 is triggered when the observed mortality 
increase or production decrease exceeds more than Y times during each of 
2 consecutive days the expected daily values, and (3) a combination of the two. The 
EWSs were evaluated according to three parameters: detection delay (days) of a 
LPAI outbreak, false alerts (%) and outbreaks missed (%).  
Results showed that an egg production-based EWS added no benefit to a mortality-
based system, mainly because H6N2 LPAI-related egg production decrease always 
occurred after increase in mortality. Combining the two EWSs resulted in a reduced 
detection delay and no missed outbreaks, but at the expense of a slight increase in 
the number of false alerts triggered. The system presented in this study also 
outperformed fixed EWSs in all three evaluated parameters. The proposed EWS, if 
used as part of a poultry cooperative program and combined with a rapid laboratory 
diagnosis, could be a useful tool in the detection and control of LPAI outbreaks and 
other poultry diseases. Built in a spreadsheet, the system could be inexpensively, 
easily and quickly incorporated into a commercial egg production farm decision 
support system. In addition, the proposed system could be quickly adjusted to 
changing epidemic situations, and easily customized to individual flocks. 
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9 Conclusions / Conclusiones 
Conclusions 
Based on the results and the conditions of the present study the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
FIRST: Avian influenza spread, which is mostly human-driven, is one the biggest 
threats to animal health, not just because of the important damages to 
poultry production, local livelihoods and trade, but also because of the public 
health implications. 
SECOND: The wild bird-poultry interface is the most researched of all wildlife 
livestock interfaces. However, although the interface exists, the role of wild 
birds in Avian Influenza outbreaks in poultry has been exaggerated, since 
they are mostly human driven, i.e. due to movements of poultry, poultry 
products and fomites. 
THIRD: For an effective surveillance, prevention and control of H5N1 HPAI, it is 
critical that all responders (i.e. farmers and others along the poultry chain, 
veterinary services and public health services) are effectively trained in 
multidisciplinary approach. In order to reach stakeholders at all levels, a 
train-the-trainer approach is the most sustainable and effective. 
FORTH: Implementing HPAI prevention, surveillance and response national 
programs is a very expensive endeavour. Costs can be significantly reduced if 
some of the tasks are combined, particularly the implementation of field 
activities like surveillance and biosecurity improvement.  
FIFTH: Syndromic surveillance base on monitoring production parameters (e.g. 
mortality or egg production) can be the most cost-effective way to detect 
the subtle changes that characterize LPAI infections, particularly in 
commercial farms. 
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Conclusiones 
En base a las condiciones del presente estudio y a los resultados obtenidos, se ha 
llegado a las siguientes conclusiones: 
PRIMERA: La diseminación de la Influenza Aviar, que normalmente es diseminada 
por humanos, es una de las mayores amenazas a la sanidad animal, no sólo 
por los importantes perjuicios en la producción de aves de corral, las 
condiciones de vida de los productores y el comercio, sino también por las 
implicaciones que tiene en la Salud Pública.   
SEGUNDA: La interacción entre aves silvestres y aves de corral es la más investigada 
de todas las interacciones de la fauna silvestre y las producciones animals. 
Sin embargo, a pesar de que esta interacción existe, el papel de las aves 
silvestres en los brotes de Influenza Aviar en naves de corral ha sido 
excesiva, ya que en la mayoría han sido transmitidas por los humanos, 
fundamentalmente debido a movimientos de aves, sus productos y fomites. 
TERCERA: Para una vigilancia epidemiológica, prevención y control efectivos de las 
cepas altamente patógenas de Influenza Aviar (HPAI) H5N1, es fundamental 
que todos los implicados (granjeros y otros implicados en la cadena 
productiva, servicios veterinarios y servicios de salud pública) estén 
entrenados debidamente con un enfoque multidisciplinar. Con el fin de 
alcanzar a los participantes de todos los niveles, un enfoque de formar-al-
formador es la más sostenible y efectiva. 
CUARTA: La implementación de programas nacionales de prevención, vigilancia 
epidemiológica y control de las cepas altamente patógenas de Influenza 
Aviar (HPAI) supone un importante esfuerzo económico. Los costes pueden 
reducirse significativamente si alguna de las tareas se combinan, 
particularmente la implementación de actividades de campo como la 
vigilancia epidemiológica y mejora de la bioseguridad. 
QUINTA: La vigilancia sindrómica basada en la monitorización de parámetros 
productivos (mortalidad o producción de huevos) puede ser la forma más 
económica para detectar los cambios sútiles que caracterizan las infecciones 
por cepas de baja patogenicidad de Influenza Aviar (LPAI), en especial en 
explotaciones comerciales. 
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11 Apéndices 
11.1. Características de las revistas 
En el presente apéndice se indican el factor de impacto (JIF) y las áreas temáticas 
correspondientes a las revistas donde se han publicado los trabajos incluidos en la 
presente Tesis Doctoral.  Todos los valores se han obtenido del Journal Citation 
Reports® disponible en ISI Web of Knowledge. 
En cada una de las áreas temáticas señaladas se indica el cuartil y entre paréntesis la 
posición de la revista indicada sobre el total de revistas incluidas en el área de 
estudio. 
Revista Public Health Reports 
JIF 1.299 Año 2008 
Áreas temáticas Public, Environmental & Occupational Health: Q3 (70 /105) 
 
Revista Preventive Veterinary Medicine 
JIF 2.121 Año 2009 
Áreas temáticas Veterinary Sciences: Q1 (10 / 142) 
 
Revista EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin 
JIF - Año 2011 
Publicada por FAO Animal Production and Health Division 
 
Revista Preventive Veterinary Medicine 
JIF 2.046 Año 2011 
Áreas temáticas Veterinary Sciences: Q1 (11 / 145) 
 
Revista Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America (PNAS) 
JIF 9.674  Año 2014* 
Áreas temáticas Mutidisciplinary Sciences: Q1 (4 / 56) 
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11.2. Contribución del doctorando y renuncia de coautores no Doctores 
El doctorando es el primer o segundo autor de todos los trabajos presentados en 
esta Tesis Doctoral, lo que justifica plenamente su contribución. Además, debemos 
indicar que todos los coautores son doctores. 
 
